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Generative deep learning algorithms have progressed to a point where it is difficult to tell the difference
between what is real and what is fake. In 2018, it was discovered how easy it is to use this technology for
unethical and malicious applications, such as the spread of misinformation, impersonation of political leaders,
and the defamation of innocent individuals. Since then, these ‘deepfakes’ have advanced significantly.
In this paper, we explore the creation and detection of deepfakes and provide an in-depth view of how
these architectures work. The purpose of this survey is to provide the reader with a deeper understanding of
(1) how deepfakes are created and detected, (2) the current trends and advancements in this domain, (3) the
shortcomings of the current defense solutions, and (4) the areas which require further research and attention.
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1 INTRODUCTION
A deepfake is content generated by artificial intelligence which seems authentic in the eyes of
a human being. The word deepfake is a combination of the words ‘deep learning’ and ‘fake’ and
primarily relates to content generated by an artificial neural network, a branch of machine learning.
The most common form of deepfakes involves the generation and manipulation of human
imagery. This technology has creative and productive applications. For example, realistic video
dubbing of foreign films1, education through the reanimation of historical figures [77], and virtually
trying on clothes while shopping.2 There are also numerous online communities devoted to creating
deepfake memes for entertainment3, such as music videos portraying the face of actor Nicolas Cage.
However, despite the positive applications of deepfakes, the technology is infamous for its un-
ethical and malicious capabilities. At the end of 2017, a Reddit user by the name of ‘deepfakes’
used deep learning to swap faces of celebrities into pornographic videos and posted them online4.
1https://variety.com/2019/biz/news/ai-dubbing-david-beckham-multilingual-1203309213/
2www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2019/05/21/gans-and-deepfakes-could-revolutionize-the-fashion-industry/
3https://www.reddit.com/r/SFWdeepfakes/
4https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/gydydm/gal-gadot-fake-ai-porn
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Ecosystem against 
Fake News from 
Humanity and 
Technology 
Perspectives 
Scams & Fraud:
Trickery via spoofing, falsifying audit 
records, generating artwork, …
Tampering of Evidence:
Medical, forensic, court, …
Harming Credibility:
Revenge porn, political sabotage via 
generated videos or articles, …
Inspired by Source: fb 
https://newsroom.fb.co
m/news/2018/05/insid
e-feed-facing-
facts/#watchnow
Deepfake Information Trust Chart
Altering Published Movies:
Comedy, satire, …
Editing & Special Effects:
Generating actors in movies, …
Art & Demonstration:
Animating dead characters, generated 
portraits, technology demos,  …
Authentic Content:
Credible Multimedia / Data 
Misdirection
Generated discourse to amplify 
events / facts, …
Political Warfare:
Tone change of articles, content 
loosely based on facts, conspiracy…
Corruption:
Increased xenophobia, …
Fig. 1. A deepfake information trust chart.
Humans:      eg face sw p
Goal/scenario is to affect human perception, samples must look 
realistic
Machines:    eg hide stop sign, predict obvious cat as car
Goal/scenario is to affect AI perception, samples can look poor 
if goal is achieved
Both:             eg fake cancer, obfusicated malware, audio sounds 
legit but interpeerted as somthgin else
Goal to affect both (to suceed must affect both), look real
Excludes samples made by humans 
(photoshopping, skilled video 
editing, ..etc). Created by machines, 
often deep learning alg rithms 
(hence the name deep)
Samples created by machines 
to fool…
humans
machines
Deepfakes
Adversarial 
Samples
both
Examples:
...humans: entertainment, impersonation, art fraud.
...machines: hiding a stop sign, evading face recog.
...both: tampering medical scans, malware evasion.
Fig. 2. The difference between adversarial
machine learning and deepfakes.
The discovery caused a media frenzy and a large number of new deepfake videos began to emerge
thereafter. In 2018, BuzzFeed released a deepfake video of former pr sident Barack Obama giving
a talk on the subject of deepfakes. The video was made using th R ddit user’s software (FakeApp),
and it raised concerns over identity theft, impersonation, and the spread of misinformation on
social media. In Fig. 1, we present an information trust chart for deepfakes, inspired by [57], which
organizes the influence of deepfakes on society.
Following these events, the subject of deepfakes gained traction in the academic community,
and the technology has been rapidly advancing over the last few years. Since 2017, the number of
papers published on the subject rose from 3 to over 150 (2018-19).
To understand where the threats are moving and how to mitigate them, we need a clear view
of the technologies, challenges, limitations, capabilities, and trajectory. Unfortunately, to the best
of our knowledge, there are no other works which present the techniques, advancements, and
challenges in a technical and encompassing way. Therefore, the goals of this paper are (1) to provide
the reader with an understanding of how modern deepfakes are created and detected, (2) to inform
the reader of the recent advances, trends, and challenges in deepfake research, (3) to serve as a guide
to the design of deepfake architectures, and (4) to identify the current status of the attacker-defender
game, the attacker’s next move, and future work that may help give the defender a leading edge.
We achieve these goals through an overview of human visual deepfakes (Section 2), followed by
a technical background which identifies basic building blocks of the technologies, limitations, and
challenges (Section 3). We then provide a chronological and systematic review for each category of
deepfake, and provide the network schematics to give the reader a deeper understanding of the
various approaches (Sections 4 and 5). Finally, after reviewing the countermeasures (Section 6), we
discuss their weaknesses, suggest alternative research, consider the adversary’s next steps, and
raise awareness to the spread of deepfakes to other domains (Section 7).
Scope. In this survey we will focus on deepfakes pertaining to the human face and body. We
will not discuss the synthesis of new faces or the editing of facial features because they do not
have a clear attack goal associated with them. In Section 7.3 we will discuss deepfakes with a much
broader scope, note the future trends, and exemplify how deepfakes have spread to other domains
and media such as forensics, finance, and healthcare.
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We emphasize that deepfakes should not be confused with adversarial machine learning, which
is the subject of fooling machine learning algorithms with maliciously crafted inputs (Fig. 2). The
difference is that for deepfakes, the objective of the generated content is to fool a human and not a
machine.
2 OVERVIEW & ATTACK MODELS
We define a deepfake as
“Believable media generated by a deep neural network”
In the context of human visuals, we identify four categories: reenactment, replacement, editing,
and synthesis. Fig. 3 illustrates some examples of facial deepfakes in each of these categories and
their sub-types. Throughout this paper we denote s and t as the source and the target identities
respectively. We also denote xs and xt as images of these identities and xд as the deepfake generated
from s and t .
2.1 Reenactment
A reenactment deepfake is where xs is used to drive the expression, mouth, gaze, pose, or body of xt :
Mouth reenactment, also known as ‘dubbing’, is where the mouth of xt is driven by that of xs , or
an audio input as containing speech. Benign uses of the technology include realistic voice
dubbing into another language and editing.
Gaze reenactment is where the direction of xt ’s eyes, and the position of the eyelids, are driven by
those of xs . This is used to improve photographs or to automatically maintain eye contact
during video interviews [41].
Pose reenactment is where the head position of xt is driven by xs . This technology has primarily
been used for face frontalization of individuals in security footage, and as a means for
improving facial recognition software [138].
Expression reenactment is where xs drives the expression of xt . It is the most common form of
reenactment since these technologies often drive a target’s mouth and pose as well, providing
a wide range of flexibility. Benign uses are found in the movie and video game industry where
the performances of actors are tweaked in post-production, and in educational media where
historical figures are reenacted.
Body reenactment, a.k.a. pose transfer or human pose synthesis, is similar to the facial reenactments
listed above except it is the pose of xt ’s body being driven.
Gaze Mouth Expression Pose Complete Transfer Swap
Source Target Face ReplacementFacial Reenactment
●: Always
○: Sometimes
𝑥𝑠 𝑥𝑡
Face Editing
Hair Article Age Beauty Ethnicity
Gaze ● ○ ○ ○
Mouth ● ○ ● ●
Expression ○ ● ● ●
Pose ● ●
Identity ● ●
Face Synthesis
Transfers:
Fig. 3. Examples and illustrations of human face reenactment, replacement, editing, and synthesis deepfakes.
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The Attack Model. Reenactment deepfakes give attackers the ability to impersonate an identity,
controlling what he or she says or does. This enables an attacker to perform acts of defamation, cause
discreditability, spread misinformation, and tamper with evidence. For example, an attacker can
impersonate t to exploit the trust of a colleague, friend, or family member as a means to gain access
to money, network infrastructure, or some other asset. An attacker can also generate embarrassing
content of t for blackmailing purposes or generate content to affect the public’s opinion of an
individual or political leader. Finally, the technology can be used to tamper surveillance footage or
some other archival imagery in an attempt to plant false evidence in a trial.
2.2 Replacement
A replacement deepfake is where the content of xt is replaced with that of xs , preserving the
identity of s .
Transfer is where the content of xt is replaced with that of xs . A common type of transfer is facial
transfer, used in the fashion industry to visualize an individual in different outfits.
Swap is where the content transferred to xt from xs is driven by xt . The most popular type of swap
replacement is ‘face swap’, often used to generate memes or satirical content by swapping the
identity of an actor with that of a famous individual. Another benign use for face swapping in-
cludes the anonymization of one’s identity in public content in-place of blurring or pixelation.
The Attack Model. Replacement deepfakes are well-known for their harmful applications. For
example, revenge porn is where an attacker swaps a victim’s face onto the body of a porn actress
to humiliate, defame, and blackmail the victim. Face replacement can also be used as a shortcut to
fully reenact t by transferring t ’s face onto the body of a look-alike. This approach has been used
as a tool for disseminating political opinions in the past [117].
2.3 Editing & Synthesis
An enchantment deepfake is where the attributes of xt are added, altered, or removed. Some exam-
ples include changing a target’s clothes, facial hair, age, weight, beauty, and ethnicity. Apps such
as FaceApp enable users to alter their appearance for entertainment and to edit other multimedia.
The same process can be used by an attacker to build a false persona for misleading others. For
example, a sick leader can be made to look healthy [58], and child or sex predators can change their
age and gender to build dynamic profiles online. A known unethical use of editing deepfakes is the
removal of a victim’s clothes for humiliation or entertainment [113].
Synthesis is where the deepfake xд is created with no target as a basis. Human face and body
synthesis techniques such as [66] (used in Fig. 3) can create royalty-free stock footage or generate
characters for movies and games. However, similar to editing deepfakes, it can also be used to
create fake personas online.
Although human image editing and synthesis are active research topics, reenactment and replace-
ment deepfakes are the greatest concern because they give an attacker control over one’s identity[11,
26, 56]. Therefore, in this survey we will be focusing on reenactment and replacement deepfakes.
3 TECHNICAL BACKGROUND
Although there are a wide variety of neural networks, most deepfakes are created using variations
or combinations of generative networks and encoder-decoder networks. In this section we provide
a brief introduction to these networks, how they are trained, and the notations which we will be
using throughout the paper.
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3.1 Neural Networks
Neural networks are non-linear models for predicting or generating content based on an input [52].
They are made up of layers of neurons, where each layer is connected sequentially via synapses.
The synapses have associated weights which collectively define the concepts learned by the model.
To execute a network on an n-dimensional input x , a process known as forward-propagation is
performedwhere x is propagated through each layer and an activation function is used to summarize
a neuron’s output (e.g., the Sigmoid or ReLU function).
To summarize this process, we considerM a black-box and denote its execution asM(x) = y. To
trainM in a supervised setting, a dataset of paired samples with the form (xi ,yi ) is obtained and an
objective loss function L is defined. The loss function is used generate a signal at the output ofM
which is back-propagated throughM to find the errors of each weight. An optimization algorithm,
such as gradient descent (GD), is then used to update the weights for a number of epochs. The
function L is often a measure of error between the input x and predicted output y ′. As a result, the
network learns the functionM(xi ) ≈ yi and can be used to make predictions on unseen data.
Some deepfake networks use a technique called one-shot or few-shot learning which enables a
pre-trained network to adapt to a new datasetX ′ similar toX on which it was trained. Two common
approaches for this are to (1) pass information on x ′ ∈ X ′ to the inner layers of M during the
feed-forward process, and (2) perform a few additional training iterations on a few samples from X ′.
3.2 Loss Functions
In order to update the weights with an optimization algorithm, such as GD, the loss function must
be differentiable [7]. There are various types of loss functions which can be applied in different
ways depending on the learning objective. For example, when trainingM as an n-class classifier, the
output ofM would be the probability vector y ∈ Rn . To trainM , we perform forward-propagation
to obtain y′ = M(x), compute the cross-entropy loss (LCE ) by comparing y ′ to the ground truth
label y, and then perform back-propagation to update the weights with the training signal. The loss
LCE over the entire training set X is calculated as
LCE = −
|X |∑
i=1
n∑
c=1
yi [c] log(y ′i [c]) (1)
where y ′[c] is the predicted probability of xi belonging to the c-th class.
Other popular loss functions used in deepfake networks include the L1 and L2 norms L1 =
|x − xд |1 and L2 = |x − xд |2. However, L1 and L2 require paired images (e.g., of s and t with
same expression) and perform poorly when there are large offsets between the images. Another
approach to compare two unaligned images is to pass them through another network and measure
the difference between the layer’s activations (feature maps). This loss is called perceptual loss
(Lperc ) and, for deepfakes, is often performed using a face recognition network such as VGGFace.
Similarly, there is a feature matching loss (LFM ) which uses the last output of a network, and
content loss (LFM ) which passes only xд and measures the difference between the activations of
the network’s layers.
3.3 Generative Neural Networks (for deepfakes)
Deepfakes are often created using combinations or variations of six different networks, five of
which are illustrated in Fig. 4.
Encoder-Decoder Networks (ED). An ED consists of at least two networks, an encoder En and
decoder De . The ED has narrower layers towards its center so that when it is trained as
De(En(x)) = xд , the network is forced to summarize the observed concepts. The summary
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Encoder Decoder
𝑥 𝐸𝑛 𝑒 𝑥𝑔𝐷𝑒
Vanilla GAN
𝑧 𝑥𝑔𝐺 𝐷
𝑥
𝑦
pix2pix
𝐺𝑐 𝑥𝑔
𝐷
𝑥
𝑦𝑐
𝑈1 𝑥𝑔
(1)
𝑈2 𝑥𝑔
(2)
𝑥(1)
𝑥(2)
𝑈𝑘 𝑥𝑔
(𝑘)
𝑥(𝑘)
⋮
𝑈 𝑥𝑔
(𝑖)
𝑥(𝑖)
=
RNN
𝑥𝑎 𝑥𝑔
𝑏
𝐷𝑎
𝐷𝑏
𝑥𝑏𝑥𝑔
𝑎
𝑥𝑏′
𝑥𝑎
′
ො𝑥𝑎
CycleGAN
Generative
Discriminator
Networks
ො𝑥𝑏
𝐻𝑎𝑏
𝐻𝑏𝑎
Fig. 4. Five basic neural network architectures used to create deepfakes. The lines indicate dataflows used
during deployment (black) and training (grey).
of x , given its distribution X , is En(x) = e , often referred to as an encoding or embedding
and E = En(X ) is referred to as the ‘latent space’. Deepfake technologies often use multiple
encoders or decoders and manipulate the encodings to influence the output xд . If an encoder
and decoder are symmetrical, and the network is trained with the objective De(En(x)) = x ,
then the network is called an autoencoder and the output is the reconstruction of x denoted
xˆ . Another special kind of ED is the variational autoencoder (VAE) where the encoder learns
the posterior distribution of the decoder given X . VAEs are better at generating content than
autoencoders because the concepts in the latent space are disentangled, and thus encodings
respond better to interpolation and modification.
Convolutional Neural Network (CNN). In contrast to a fully connected (dense) network, a CNN
learns pattern hierarchies in the data and is therefore muchmore efficient at handling imagery.
A convolutional layer in a CNN learns filters, which are shifted over the input forming an
abstract feature map as the output. Pooling layers are used to reduce the dimensionality as
the network gets deeper and up-sampling layers are used to increase it. With convolutional,
pooling, and upsampling layers, it is possible to build an ED CNN for imagery.
Generative Adversarial Networks (GAN) The GAN was first proposed in 2014 by Goodfellow
et al. in [53]. A GAN consists of two neural networks which work against each other: the
generator G and the discriminator D. G creates fake samples xд with the aim of fooling D,
and D learns to differentiate between real samples (x ∈ X ) and fake samples (xд = G(z)
where z ∼ N ). Concretely, there is an adversarial loss used to train D and G respectively:
Ladv (D) = max logD(x) + log(1 − D(G(z))) (2)
Ladv (G) = min log(1 − D(G(z))) (3)
This zero-sum game leads to G learning how to generate samples that are indistinguishable
from the original distribution. After training, D is discarded andG is used to generate content.
When applied to imagery, this approach produces photo realistic images.
Image-to-Image Translation (pix2pix). Numerous variations and improvements on GANs have
been proposed over the years. One popular version is the pix2pix framework which enables
translations from one image domain to another [62]. In pix2pix,G tries to generate the image
xд given a visual context xc as an input, and D discriminates between (x ,xc ) and (xд ,xc ).
Moreover,G is an EDCNNwith skip connections from En toDe (called a U-Net) which enables
G to produce high fidelity imagery by bypassing the compression layers when needed. Later,
pix2pixHD was proposed [147] for generating high resolution imagery with better fidelity.
CycleGAN. An improvement of pix2pix which enables image translation through unpaired train-
ing [168]. The network forms a cycle consisting of two GANs used to convert images from
one domain to another, and then back again to ensure consistency with a cycle consistency
loss (Lcyc ).
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Recurrent Neural Networks (RNN) An RNN is a type of neural network that can handle se-
quential and variable length data. The network remembers its internal state after processing
x (i − 1) and can use it to process x (i) and so on. In deepfake creation, RNNs are often used to
handle audio and sometimes video. More advanced versions of RNNs include long short-term
memory (LSTM) and gate recurrent units (GRU).
3.4 Feature Representations
Most deep fake architectures use some form of intermediate representation to capture and sometimes
manipulate s and t ’s facial structure, pose, and expression. One way is to use the facial action
coding system (FACS) and measure each of the face’s taxonomized action units (AU) [39]. Another
way is to use monocular reconstruction to obtain a 3D morphable model (3DMM) of the head from
a 2D image, where the pose and expression are parameterized by a set of vectors and matrices.
Then, use the parameters or a 3D rendering of the head itself as the model’s input. Some use a UV
map of the head or body to give the network a better understanding of the shape’s orientation.
Another approach is to use image segmentation to help the network separate the different
concepts (face, hair, etc). The most common representation is landmarks (a.k.a. key-points) which
are a set of defined positions on the face or body which can be efficiently tracked using the open
source computer vision library (Open CV). The landmarks are often presented to the networks as a
2D image with Gaussian points at each landmark. Some works separate the landmarks by channel
to make it easier for the network to identity and associate them. Similarly, facial boundaries and
body skeletons can also used.
For audio (speech), themost common approach is to split the audio into segments, and for each seg-
ment, measure the Mel-Cepstral Coefficients (MCC) which capture the dominant voice frequencies.
3.5 Deepfake Creation Basics
To generate xд , reenactment and face swap networks follow some variation of this process (illus-
trated in Fig. 5): Pass x through a pipeline that (1) detects and crops the face, (2) extracts intermediate
representations, (3) generates a new face based on some driving signal (e.g., another face), and then
(4) blends the generated face back into the target frame.
In general there are six approaches to driving an image:
(1) Let a network work directly on the image and perform the mapping itself.
(2) Train an ED network to disentangle the identity from the expression, and then modify/swap
the encodings of the target before passing it through the decoder.
(3) Add an additional encoding (e.g., AU or embedding) before passing it to the decoder.
𝑥𝑠 and/or 𝑥𝑡 Detect & Crop Intermediate Representation
Preprocessing
Generation Blending 𝑥𝑔
𝑀
𝑥𝑔
′
Postprocessing
Driver and/or 
Identify
Landmarks/
key points
Boundaries/
Skeleton
Depth MapUV Map
3DMM
Parameters
𝑃
Fig. 5. The processing pipeline for making reenactment and face swap deepfakes. Usually only a subset of
these steps are performed.
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(4) Convert the intermediate face/body representation to the desired identity/expression before
generation (e.g., transform the boundaries with a secondary network or render a 3D model
of the target with the desired expression).
(5) Use the optical flow field from subsequent frames in a source video to drive the generator.
(6) Create a composite of the original content (hair, scene, etc) with a combination of the 3D
rendering, warped image, or generated content, and pass the composite through another
network (such as pix2pix) to refine the realism.
3.6 Generalization
A deepfake network may be trained or designed to work with only a specific set of target and source
identities. An identity agnostic model is sometimes hard to achieve due to correlations learned
by the model between s and t during training. We identify three primary relationships in this
regard: one-to-one xд = Mt (Es (xs )), many-to-one xд = Mt (E(xs )), and many-to-many xд =
M(E1(xs ),E2(xt )), where E is some model or process for representing or extracting features from x .
3.7 Challenges
The following are some challenges in creating realistic deepfakes:
Generalization. Generative networks are data driven and therefore reflect the training data in
their outputs. This means that high quality images of a specific identity requires a large
number of samples of that identity. Moreover, it is typically much easier to obtain access to
a large dataset of the driving content than a dataset of the victim. As a result, over the last
few years, researchers have worked hard to minimize the amount of training data required,
and to enable the execution of a trained model on new target and source identities (unseen
during training).
Paired Training. One way to train a neural network is to present the desired output to the model
for each given input. This process of data pairing is laborious and sometimes impractical
when training on multiple identities and actions. To avoid this issue, many deepfake networks
either (1) train in a self-supervised manner by using frames selected from the same video of t ,
(2) use unpaired networks such as Cycle-GAN, or (3) utilize the encodings of an ED network.
Identity Leakage. Sometimes the identity of the driver (e.g., s in reenactment) is partially trans-
ferred to xд . This occurs when training on a single input identity, or when the network is
trained on many identities but data pairing is done with the same identity. Some solutions
proposed by researchers include attention mechanisms, few-shot learning, disentanglement,
boundary conversions, and AdaIN or skip connections to carry the relevant information to
the generator.
Occlusions. Occlusions occur when part of xs or xt is obstructed with a hand, hair, glasses, or any
other item. Another type of obstruction is the eyes and mouth region that may be hidden or
dynamically changing. As a result, artifacts, such as cropped imagery or inconsistent facial
features, may appear. To mitigate this, works such as [103, 109, 124] perform segmentation
and in-painting on the obstructed areas.
Temporal Coherence. Deepfake videos often produce more obvious artifacts, such as flickering
and jitter [142]. This is because most deepfake networks process each frame individually
with no context of the preceding frames. To mitigate this, some researchers either provide
this context to G and D, implement temporal coherence losses, use RNNs, or perform a
combination thereof.
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Table 1. Summary of Deep Learning Reenactment Models (Body and Face)
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[14] 2018 Recycle-GAN • • • 5-10 min. video 5-10 min. video 4 4 2 0 • • • portrait - • 512x512
[61] 2018 DeepFaceLab • • • 1-3 hr. video 1-3 hr. video 1 2 1 1 • • • portrait video - • 512x512
O
ne
-to
-O
ne
[89] 2019 Liu et al. 2019 • • • • 1-3 hr. video 1-3 hr. video 4 4 2 1 • • • • • upperbody video - • >256x256
[131] 2017 Syth. Obama • None 17 hr. video 0 0 0 1 • • • audio portiat video • 2048x1024
[76] 2017 ObamaNet • None 17 hr. video 1 1 1 1 • • • • text - • 256x256
[70] 2018 Deep Video Portr. • • • • None 1-3 min. video 1 1 1 0 • • • • • portrait video neural texture • 1024x1024
[150] 2018 ReenactGAN • • • None 30 min. video N N N 1 • • • • portrait portriat • 256x256
[146] 2018 Vid2vid • • • ◦ or • None 3-8 min. video 3 3 2 1 • • • • portrait video - • 2048x1024
[141] 2018 MocoGAN • • or • None 1 min. video 2 1 2 N • • • • expression label identity label • 64x64
[63] 2018 SD-CGAN • ◦ ◦ None 2 hr. video 0 1 1 1 • • • • audio - • 128x128
[157] 2019 GRN • None 3-10 images o 3 1 0 2 • • gaze 3-10 eye images • 64x128
[48] 2019 TETH • None 1 hr. video 1 1 2 0 • • • • text portiat video • 512x512
[133] 2019 N.V. Puppetry • None 2-3 min. video 3 2 2 4 • • • • audio portiat video • 512x512
[88] 2019 NRR-HAV • • None 8 min. video 1 1 1 0 • • • • body image background • 512x512
[2] 2019 Deep Video P.C. • • None 2 min. video 0 1 2 2 • • • • body image - • 256x256
[23] 2019 Everybody D. N. • • • None 20 min. video 0 2 4 2 • • • • body image - • 256x256
[167] 2019 D. D. Generation • • None 3 min. video 2 2 2 2 • • • • • body video - ◦ • 512x512
[159] 2019 N. Talking Heads • • • None 1-3 portraits o 1 2 1 1 • • • • portrait/landmarks 1-3 portraits • 256x256
M
an
y-
to
-O
ne
[145] 2019 Few-shot Vid2Vid • • • ◦ or • None 1-10 portraits o 3 3 2 4 • • • portrait/body video 1-10 portr./bodies • 2048x1024
[122] 2015 Shimba et al. • ◦ None None • 0 0 0 1 • • • • audio face database • *
[50] 2016 DeepWarp • None None • 0 0 0 2 • • • gaze eye image • >40x50
[15] 2017 CVAE-GAN • • • None None • 1 1 1 1 • • • latent variables portrait • >128x128
[105] 2017 RDFT • • None None • 1 1 1 0 • • • portrait portrait • 256x256
[166] 2017 FE-CDAE • • None None • 1 1 2 0 • • • • portrait AU label • 32x32
[96] 2018 paGAN • • • • None None • 1 1 1 1 • • • • portrait portrait - neutral • 512x512
[149] 2018 X2Face • • • None None • 2 2 0 1 • • • portrait 1-3 portraits • 256x256
[114] 2018 GANnotation • • • None None • 1 1 1 3 • • • • portrait/landmarks portrait • 128x128
[108] 2018 GATH • • None None • 1 1 1 2 • • • portrait/AUs portrait • 100x100
[120] 2018 FaceID-GAN • • • None None • 1 1 2 1 • • • • portrait portriat • 128x128
[121] 2018 FaceFeat-GAN • • • None None • 1 1 3 4 • • • • latent variables portrait • 128x128
[60] 2018 CAPG-GAN • None None • 1 1 2 1 • • • • portrait portrait • 128x128
[138] 2018 DR-GAN • None None • 1 1 1 0 • • • pose 1+ portraits • 96x96
[125] 2018 Deformable GAN • • None None • 1 1 1 0 • • • • body image/landm. body image • 256x256
[13] 2018 SHUP • • None None • 3 3 1 1 • • • • body image body image/pose • 256x256
[42] 2018 DPIG • • None None • 4 2 1 0 • • • body image body image • 128x64
[99] 2018 Dense Pose Tr. • • None None • 25 25 1 2 • • • body image body image • 256x256
[126] 2018 Song et al. • ◦ None None • 2 1 3 0 • • audio portrait • 128x128
[51] 2019 wg-GAN • • None None • 2 2 3 0 • • • portrait portrait • 256x256
[103] 2019 FSGAN • • • None None • 1 1 1 1 • • • • • portrait/landmarks portrait • 256x256
[109] 2019 GANimation • • None None • 2 2 1 1 • • • portrait/AUs portrait • 128x128
[139] 2019 ICface • • • None None • 2 2 1 2 • • • • portrait/AUs portrait • 128x128
[161] 2019 FaceSwapNet • • None None • 4 2 1 0 • • • portrait/landmarks portrait/landmarks • 256x256
[123] 2019 Monkey-Net • • or • None None • 3 3 1 0 • • • • portrait/body portrait/body • 64x64
[124] 2019 First-Order-Model • • • or • None None • 3 3 1 1 • • • • portrait/body portrait/body • 256x256
[106] 2019 M&T GAN • • None None • 2 1 2 1 • • • • expression label portrait • 64x64
[44] 2019 AF-VAE • • • None None • 2 1 0 1 • • portrait/boundaries portrait • 256x256
[49] 2019 Fu et al. 2019 • • • None None • 3 2 3 4 • • • portrait/label portrait • 1024x1024
[162] 2019 FusionNet • • • • None None • 1 2 3 3 • • portriat/landmarks portrait • 256x256
[22] 2019 AD-GAN • None None • 2 2 2 1 • • • pose portrait • 128x128
[142] 2019 Speech D. Anm. 1 • ◦ ◦ None None • 5 1 2 3 • • • audio portrait • 96x128
[143] 2019 Speech D. Anm. 2 • ◦ ◦ None None • 5 1 3 3 • • • audio portrait • 96x128
[67] 2019 Speech D. Anm. 3 • ◦ ◦ None None • 5 1 3 3 • • • audio portrait • 96x128
[165] 2019 DAVS • None None • 3 1 1 4 • • • • audio/portrait video portrait ◦ • 256x256
[25] 2019 ATVGnet • None None • 1 0 1 5 • • • • audio portiat video • 128x128
[64] 2019 Speech2Vid • None None • 3 1 0 2 • • • audio portiat video • 109x109
[158] 2019 DwNet • None None • 2 1 1 3 • • • • • body video body image • 256x256
[32] 2019 C-DGPose • • None None • 2 1 1 0 • • • body image body/pose image • 64x64
[169] 2019 PPAT-PIG • • None None • 2 1 2 1 • • body image body/pose image • 256x256
[148] 2020 ImaGINator • • None None • 1 1 2 0 • • • expression label portrait • 64x64
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[55] 2020 MarioNETte • • • None None • 2 2 1 3 • • • • portrait 1-8 portraits • 256x256
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4 REENACTMENT
In this section, we present a chronological review of deep learning based reenactment, organized
according to their class of identity generalization. Table 1 provides a summary and systematization
of all the works mentioned in this section.
4.1 Expression Reenactment
Expression reenactment turns an identity into a puppet, giving attackers the most flexibility to
achieve their desired impact. Before we review the subject, we note that expression reenactment
had been around long before deepfakes were popularized. In 2003, researchers morphed models of
3D scanned heads [18]. In 2005, it was shown how this can be done without a 3D model [24]. Later,
between 2015 and 2018, Thies et al. demonstrated how 3D parametric models can be used to achieve
high quality and real-time results with depth sensing and ordinary cameras ([135] and [136, 137]).
Today deep learning approaches are recognized as the simplest way to generate believable
content. To help the reader understand the networks and follow the text, we provide the model’s
network schematics and loss functions in figures 6-8.
4.1.1 One-to-One (Identity to Identity). In 2017, the authors of [152] used a CycleGAN for facial
reenactment, without the need for data pairing. The two domains were video frames of s and
t . However, to avoid artifacts in xд , the authors note that both domains must share a similar
distributions (e.g., poses and expressions).
In 2018, Bansal et al. proposed a generic translation network based on CycleGAN called Recycle-
GAN [14]. Their framework improved temporal coherence and mitigated artifacts by including
next-frame predictor networks for each domain. For facial reenactment, the authors trained their
network to translate the facial landmarks of xs into portraits of xt .
4.1.2 Many-to-One (Multiple Identities to a Single Identity). In 2017, the authors of [15] presented
CVAE-GAN, a conditional VAE-GAN where the generator is conditioned on an attribute vector
or class label. A weakness of reenactment with CVAE-GAN is that it requires manual attribute
morphing by interpolating the latent variables (e.g., between target poses).
Later, in 2018, a large number of source-identity agnostic models were published, each proposing
a different method to decoupling s from t :5
Facial Boundary Conversion. One approach was to first convert the structure of source’s facial
boundaries to that of the target’s before passing them through the generator [150]. Their framework
‘ReenactGAN’ the authors use a CycleGAN to transform the boundary bs to the target’s face shape
as bt before generating xд with a pix2pix-like generator.
Temporal GANs. To improve the temporal coherence of deepfake videos, the authors of [141]
developed MoCoGAN: a temporal GAN which generates videos while disentangling the motion
and content (objects) in the process. Each frame is generated using a target expression label zc , and
a motion embedding z(i)M for the i-th frame, obtained from a noise seeded RNN. MoCoGAN uses two
discriminators, one for realism (per frame) and one for temporal coherence (on the last T frames).
Instead of using an RNN, another way of handling temporal coherence is the network with
some temporal context (e.g., the last few frames). The authors of [146] took this approach in a
framework called Vid2Vid, which is similar to pix2pix but for videos. Vid2Vid considers the temporal
aspect by generating each frame based on the last L source and generated frames. The model also
considers optical flow to perform next-frame occlusion prediction (due to moving objects). Similar
5Although works such as [105] and [166] achieved fully agnostic models (many-to-many) in 2017, their works were on low
resolution or partial faces.
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𝑥𝑠 , 𝑥𝑡 , 𝑥𝑔: The source, target, and generated images (e.g., portraits)
𝑦: A label (e.g., fake vs real, one-hot encoding, …)
𝑥′: Another sample from the same distribution, ො𝑥: reconstructed
𝑚: Binary mask, 𝑠: Segmentation map, 𝑙: Landmark or Keypoint, 𝑧: Noise
: Concatenate,      : Subtract,      :Multiply        : Add          : Paste content
: Crop out region 𝑎 from image where 𝑎 ∈ {f:face, e:eye, m:mouth}
: Create mask using region 𝑎 of the image where 𝑎 ∈ {f:face, e:eye, m:mouth}
𝑥 𝑎 : Image 𝑥 cropped to the region of 𝑎 ∈ {𝑓:face, 𝑒:eye, 𝑚:mouth}
: Spatial replication of a vector (channel-wise or dim-wise)
: Scale image down by factor of X
𝐿𝐸, 𝐵𝐸, 𝐴𝐸, 3𝐷𝐸: Landmark, Boundary, Action Unit (AU), 
and 3DMM facial model Extractors (open source CV library)
𝐿𝑇, 3𝐷𝑇: Landmark and 3D model transformers, from 𝑠 to 𝑡
𝑀𝐸: MFCC audio feature extractor
𝑎
𝑎
s
÷
x
∑ p
Losses: L1 : L1, L2 : L2, LCE : Cross Entropy, Ladv : Adversarial, LFM :
Feature Matching, Lperc : Perceptual, Lcyc : Cycle Consistency, Latt :
Attention, Ltr ip : Triplet, Ltv : Total Variance, LKL : KL Divergence
[150] Reenact GAN:
Generic Boundary Encoder
𝑏: facial boundaries, 𝑏𝑥𝑔: a boundary translated to domain 𝑥
𝑥𝑠 𝐻1 𝐻2 𝑏𝑠 𝐻𝑡𝐻∙𝑡 𝑏𝑡𝑔
𝐻𝑡∙
CycleGAN
𝐷∙
𝐷𝑡
𝑏𝑡
𝑏𝑠𝑔
𝑥𝑔
𝐼
𝐷 𝑦
𝑥𝑡
Target Specific 
Generator𝑏𝑡
′
𝑏𝑠
′
෠𝑏𝑠
VGG16
Source Generic Target Specific
Reenact GAN
ℒ𝑎𝑑𝑣: 𝑦, ൗ
𝑥𝑔
𝑥𝑡 ℒ1: 𝑥𝑡 , 𝑥𝑔 ℒ𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡: 𝐼ℓ2 𝑥𝑔 , 𝐼ℓ3 𝑥𝑔 ℒ𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒:
෠𝑏𝑡, 𝑏𝑡
ℒ𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒: ෠𝑏𝑠, 𝑏𝑠 ℒ𝑎𝑑𝑣(∙): 𝑦∙, ൗ
𝑏∙
′
𝑏𝑠𝑔
ℒ𝑎𝑑𝑣(𝑡): 𝑦𝑡 , ൗ
𝑏𝑡
′
𝑏𝑡𝑔
[141] MocoGAN:
𝑦𝑠: source expression label, 𝑒𝑡: one-hot encoding of target identity, 
𝑒𝑥: temporal expression embedding, 𝐺𝑅𝑈: Gated Recurrent Unit of an RNN
𝑥𝑔
(1)
𝑥𝑔
(2)
⋮
𝑥𝑔
(𝐾)
𝑒𝑡𝑧
𝐺𝑅𝑈1
𝐺𝑅𝑈2
𝐺𝑅𝑈𝐾
𝑒𝑥
(1)
𝑒𝑥
(2)
𝑒𝑥
(𝐾)
𝑦𝑠
𝐺𝑇
𝐺𝑇
𝐺𝑇
Sample 1
Sample T
= 𝑋𝑔
𝑋𝑡
′
𝐷𝑉 𝑦𝑉
𝐷𝐼 𝑦𝐼
Image Disc.
Video Disc.
MocoGAN
ℒ𝑎𝑑𝑣(𝐼): 𝑦𝐼 , ൘
𝑥𝑡
′(𝑖)
𝑥𝑔
(𝑖) ℒ𝑎𝑑𝑣(𝑉): 𝑦𝑉 , ൘
𝑋𝑡
(𝑖:𝑖+𝑇)
𝑋𝑔
(𝑖:𝑖+𝑇)
[146] Vid2Vid:
𝑙𝑠
(𝑖−𝐿)
, … 𝑙𝑠
(𝑖)
𝑥𝑔
(𝑖−𝐿)
, … 𝑥𝑔
(𝑖−1)
𝑥𝑠
(𝑖−𝐿)
, … 𝑥𝑠
(𝑖)
𝐿𝐸
𝐻
Intermediate Synth.
Occlusion Masking
Warp Field Pred.
𝑀
𝑊
ℎ𝑔
(𝑖)
𝑚𝑔
(𝑖)
𝑤𝑔
(𝑖)
-1 +1
∑
∑
Warp
𝑥𝑔
(𝑖−1)
𝑥𝑤
(𝑖)
𝑥𝑔
(𝑖) 𝐷𝐼 𝑦𝐼
𝐷𝑉 𝑦𝑉
Image Disc.
Video Disc.
𝑥𝑡
(𝑖)
𝑙𝑡
(𝑖)
𝑤𝑡
𝑖−𝐾−1 :(𝑖)
𝑥𝑡
𝑖−𝐾 :(𝑖)
𝑥𝑔
𝑖−𝐾 :(𝑖)
𝐼𝑥𝑡
(𝑖)
, 𝑥𝑔
(𝑖)
𝐿 = 2
𝑇: frames in the video clip, 𝐿, 𝐾: system parameters
VGG19
Vid2Vid
ℒ𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤: 𝑤𝑔
(1:𝑇)
, 𝑤𝑡
1:𝑇 , 𝑥𝑤
1:𝑇 , 𝑥𝑡
(1:𝑇)
ℒ𝐹𝑀(𝐼): 𝑥𝑡
(𝑖)
, 𝑥𝑔
(𝑖)
ℒ𝐹𝑀(𝐷𝐼): 𝑥𝑡
(𝑖)
, 𝑥𝑔
(𝑖)
ℒ𝑎𝑑𝑣 𝐷𝐼 : 𝑦𝐼 , 𝑙𝑡
𝑖 , ൘
𝑥𝑡
(𝑖)
𝑥𝑔
(𝑖) ℒ𝑎𝑑𝑣𝑉 𝐷𝑉 : 𝑦𝑉 , 𝑤𝑡
𝑖−𝐾−1 : 𝑖 , ൘
𝑥𝑡
𝑖−𝐾 : 𝑖
𝑥𝑔
𝑖−𝐾 : 𝑖
[70] Deep Video Portrait:
𝑚𝑒𝑦𝑒: mask of eye region (gaze), 𝑥𝑈𝑉: UV correspondence map, 𝑥𝑐𝑔𝑖: 3D rendered 
image of 𝑥
𝑥𝑡
𝑥𝑠
(𝑖)
3𝐷𝐸
3𝐷𝑇
𝑥𝑐𝑔𝑖
(𝑖−𝑁)
, … 𝑥𝑐𝑔𝑖
(𝑖)
𝑥𝑈𝑉
(𝑖−𝑁)
, … 𝑥𝑈𝑉
(𝑖)
𝑚𝑒𝑦𝑒
(𝑖−𝑁)
, …𝑚𝑒𝑦𝑒
(𝑖)
Refine
𝐻 𝑥𝑔
(𝑖)
𝐷 𝑦
𝑥𝑡
(𝑖)
𝑥𝑡
(𝑖−𝑁)
, … 𝑥𝑡
(𝑖)
f
f
f
Deep Video Portrait
ℒ1: 𝑥𝑡
𝑖 , 𝑥𝑔
(𝑖)
ℒ𝑎𝑑𝑣: 𝑦, 𝑥𝑡
(𝑖−𝑁)
, … 𝑥𝑡
(𝑖)
, ൘
𝑥𝑡
𝑖
𝑥𝑔
(𝑖)
[108] GATH:
𝑥𝑡
𝑥𝑠
𝐸𝑛 𝑒𝑠 𝐷𝑒 𝐷
𝐼
𝐴
𝐴𝑈𝐸 𝑎𝑠
𝑥𝑔 𝑦
𝑎𝑔
′ , 𝑎𝑠
′
𝑦𝑡
′, 𝑦𝑔
𝑥𝑡
′ shared weights
s
GATH
ℒ𝑎𝑑𝑣: 𝑦, ൗ
𝑥𝑔
𝑥𝑡
′ ℒ𝐴𝑈 𝐴 : ℒ2 𝑎𝑔
′ , 𝑎𝑠
′ ℒ1: 𝑥𝑡 , 𝑥𝑔 ℒ𝐶𝐸 𝐼 : 𝑦𝑡
′, 𝑦𝑔 ℒ𝑡𝑣: 𝑥𝑔
[109] GANimation:
𝑚𝑎: attention mask,   𝑚𝑐: color mask 
𝑥𝑡
𝑥𝑠 𝐴𝑈𝐸 𝑎𝑠
𝐸𝑛1
𝐷𝑒1
𝐷𝑒2
𝑚𝑎
𝑚𝑐
∑ ∑
-1 +1
𝑥𝑔 𝐷 𝑦𝐷
𝐴 𝑎𝑡
𝑥𝑡
′
s
GANimation
ℒ1: 𝐺 𝐺 𝑥𝑡, 𝑎𝑠 , 𝑎𝑡 , 𝑥𝑡 ℒ𝑡𝑣: 𝑚𝑎 ℒ𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑛: 𝑚𝑎 -see paper
ℒ𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛: 𝑎𝑡, ൗ
𝑥𝑔
𝑥𝑡
′ -see paper                  ℒ𝑎𝑑𝑣: 𝑦, ൗ
𝑥𝑔
𝑥𝑡
′
[114] GANotation:
𝐿𝐸𝑥𝑠 𝑙𝑠
𝑥𝑡
𝐻
𝑚𝑎
𝑚𝑐
∑ ∑
-1 +1
𝑥𝑔
𝑥𝑡
′
Light
CNN
𝐷 𝑦
𝑃
𝐼
𝑥𝑡
VGG19
𝑚𝑎: attention mask, 𝑚𝑐: color map, training: 𝑠 and 𝑡 have same ID
GANotation
ℒ𝑡𝑣: 𝑥𝑠, 𝑥𝑔 ℒ2: 𝑥𝑠, 𝑥𝑔 (same ID)                    ℒ𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦: 𝐻 𝑥𝑔, 𝑙𝑡 , 𝑥𝑡 ℒ𝑎𝑑𝑣: 𝑦, 𝑥𝑔, 𝑥𝑡
′
ℒ3×𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦: 𝐻 𝑥𝑔, 𝑙𝑠
′ , 𝐻 𝑥𝑡, 𝑙𝑠
′ ℒ𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐: 𝐼ℓ𝑘,ℓ𝑘−1 𝑥𝑔 , 𝐼ℓ𝑘,ℓ𝑘−1 𝑥𝑡
ℒ𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐: 𝑃ℓ𝑘,ℓ𝑘−1 𝑥𝑔 , 𝑃ℓ𝑘,ℓ𝑘−1 𝑥𝑡
[120] FaceID-GAN:
𝑥𝑡
𝑥𝑠
𝐼
𝑃
𝑒𝑡
𝑝𝑡
𝑝𝑠
3𝐷𝑇 𝑝𝑡𝑠
𝐷𝑒 𝑥𝑔
𝐷
𝐼
𝑃
𝑒𝑔
𝑝𝑔
ො𝑥𝑡
ො𝑥𝑔
𝑥𝑡
3DMM predictor
Identity encoder
FaceID-GAN
ℒ𝑎𝑑𝑣: ℒ1 𝑥𝑡, ො𝑥𝑡 − 𝛼ℒ1(𝑥𝑔, ො𝑥𝑔) ℒ𝐶𝐸 𝐼 : 𝑒𝑔, 𝑦𝑖𝑑 ℒ𝐶𝐸 𝐼 : 𝑒𝑡 , 𝑦𝑖𝑑
ℒ1 𝐷𝑒 : 𝑥𝑔, ො𝑥𝑔 ℒ2 𝐷𝑒 : 𝑝𝑡𝑠 , 𝑝𝑔 ℒ𝑐𝑜𝑠 𝐷𝑒 : 𝑒𝑔, 𝑒𝑡
ℒ𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒 𝑃 : 𝑝𝑡, 3𝐷𝑀𝑀 𝑥𝑡
[121] FaceFeat-GAN:
3DMM pred.
Encoder
ID predictor
𝑧𝑝
𝑥𝑠
𝐺𝑝
𝐺𝑞
𝐼
𝑃
𝑄
𝑧𝑞
𝑝
𝑞
𝑝′
𝑞’
𝑦𝑡
𝑝
𝑞
𝑥𝑡
𝐷𝑒 𝐷
𝑥𝑡
ො𝑥𝑡
𝑥𝑔 𝑦
𝐷𝑝
𝐷𝑞
𝑦𝑝
𝑦𝑞
𝑧: Sample of random noise later mapped to 𝑥𝑠
ℒ𝑎𝑑𝑣(𝐷): 𝑦, ൗ
𝑥𝑡
𝑥𝑔, ො𝑥𝑡
ℒ𝑎𝑑𝑣 𝐷𝑝 : 𝑦𝑝, Τ
𝑝
𝑝′ ℒ𝑎𝑑𝑣 𝐷𝑞 : 𝑦𝑞 , Τ
𝑞
𝑞′ ℒ𝐶𝐸 𝐼 : 𝑦𝑡, 𝑦𝑡
′
ℒ𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒 𝑃 : 𝑝, 3𝐷𝑀𝑀(𝑥𝑡) ℒ1 𝑄 : 𝑥𝑡, 𝐺 𝑦𝑡, 𝑝, 𝑄 𝑥𝑡 ℒ1 𝐺 : 𝑥𝑡, ො𝑥𝑡
ℒ2 𝐺 : 𝐼 ො𝑥𝑡 , 𝑦𝑡 & 𝐼 𝑥𝑔 , 𝑦𝑡
Fig. 6. Architectural schematics of reenactment networks. Black lines indicate prediction flows used during
deployment, dashed gray lines indicate dataflows performed during training. Zoom in for more detail.
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[96] paGAN:
𝑥𝑠
𝑥𝑡
𝑥𝑈𝑉: UV correspondence map, 𝑥𝑐𝑔𝑖: 3D rendered image of 𝑥, 𝑥𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ: image of depth 
map of model 𝑥
3𝐷𝐸
𝑥𝑡
𝑓
3𝐷𝑇
𝑚𝑡
𝑒
𝑥𝑠𝑡
𝑈𝑉
𝑥𝑠𝑡
𝑐𝑔𝑖
𝑥𝑠𝑡
𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ
𝑥𝑠
𝑓
f e
f
f
𝑥𝑔
𝑓𝐻
Refiner
Blend 𝑥𝑔
𝐼
𝑥𝑡
𝐷 𝑦𝑥𝑡
𝑐𝑔𝑖
𝑥𝑠𝑡
𝑐𝑔𝑖
paGAN
ℒ𝑎𝑑𝑣: 𝑥𝑡
𝑓
, 𝑚𝑡
𝑒
, 𝑥𝑠𝑡
𝑈𝑉, 𝑥𝑠𝑡
𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ, ൘
𝑥𝑠
𝑓
,𝑥𝑡
𝑐𝑔𝑖
𝑥𝑔
𝑓
,𝑥𝑠𝑡
𝑐𝑔𝑖 ℒ𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐(𝐼): 𝑥𝑡
𝑓
, 𝑥𝑔
𝑓
ℒ1: 𝑥𝑠𝑡
𝑐𝑔𝑖
, 𝑥𝑔
𝑓
[149] X2Face:
𝑣: vector map of pixel deltas (changes), 𝑥𝜂: a face with a neutral expression/pose, 
𝑎: some other modality (e.g., audio)
𝑥𝑡
Encoding Network
𝐸𝑛𝑡 interpolate𝑣𝑡
𝐸𝑛 𝐷𝑒
Driving Network
𝑥𝑠 𝑒𝑠
map𝑎𝑠
OR
𝑣𝑠 interpolate
𝑥𝑡
𝜂
𝑥𝑔
𝐼
𝑥𝑡
′
X2Face
ℒ1: 𝑥𝑠 , 𝑥𝑔 ℒ𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐(𝐼): 𝑥𝑡 , 𝑥𝑔
[161] FaceSwapNet:
𝑥𝑠
𝑥𝑡
𝐿𝐸
𝑙𝑠
𝑙𝑡
𝐸𝑛1
𝐸𝑛2
𝐷𝑒 𝑙𝑔 𝐸𝑛3
𝐻
𝐷 𝑦
𝑥𝑔
𝑥𝑡
′
AdaIN
Landmark Converter
Landmark Guided 
Generator
FaceSwapNet
ℒ1: 𝑥𝑔, 𝑥𝑡
′ (with same expr.)                             ℒ2: 𝑙𝑔, 𝑙𝑡
′ (with same expr.) ℒ𝑎𝑑𝑣: 𝑦, 𝑥𝑔, 𝑥𝑡
′
ℒ𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡: ℒ𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐(𝑥𝑡1, 𝑥𝑡2), ℒ𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐(𝑥𝑡1, 𝑥𝑠)
Same ID, different expression Different IDs
[103] FSGAN:
𝑚: segmentation mask (face, hair, other), 𝑙: 3D facial landmarks, 𝐻𝑛: 𝑛 passes through 
𝐻 while interpolating 𝑙𝑠 to 𝑙𝑡
𝑥𝑡
𝑥𝑠
𝐿𝐸
𝑙𝑡 𝐻
𝑥𝑔
𝑚𝑔
𝐷 𝑦
𝑥𝑡
′
𝐼𝑥𝑡
(𝑖)
, 𝑥𝑔
(𝑖)
VGG19
Reenactment
× 𝑛
𝑙𝑠
FSGAN
ℒ1: 𝑥𝑔, 𝑥𝑡 ℒ1: 𝐻
𝑛(𝑥𝑔, 𝑙𝑠), 𝑥𝑡 ℒ𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐(𝐻): 𝐼ℓ∗(𝑥𝑡), 𝐼ℓ∗(𝑥𝑡)
ℒ𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐(𝐻): 𝐼ℓ∗(𝐻
𝑛(𝑥𝑔, 𝑙𝑠)), 𝐼ℓ∗(𝑥𝑡) ℒ𝑎𝑑𝑣: 𝑦, 𝑥𝑔, 𝑥𝑡
′
[49] Fu et al. 2019:
𝑥𝑡
𝑥𝑠 Boundary encoder𝐵𝐸
𝑏𝑡
𝑏𝑠
𝑃
𝐸
𝐸𝑛𝑏1
𝐷𝑒𝑏1 𝑏𝑔 𝐸𝑛𝑏2
𝐸𝑛𝑡
𝐷𝑒𝑔
𝐼1
𝐼2𝑝𝑠
𝑒𝑠
𝑣𝑡
𝑣𝑔
𝑡𝑡
𝑥𝑡
′
𝐵𝐸
𝑥𝑔
𝐷1:3
÷1,2,4
𝑦1:3
𝑥𝑠
Texture encoder
Pose predictor
Expr. predictor
Boundary encoder
Fu et al. 2019
ℒ𝑟𝑒𝑔 𝐷𝑒𝑏 : 𝐷𝑒𝑏 𝑝𝑠
′ , 𝑒𝑠
′ , 𝑣𝑡 , 𝑃 𝑝𝑠
′ , 𝐸(𝑒𝑠
′) ℒ1 𝐷𝑒𝑏 : 𝑏𝑡 , 𝑏𝑔 ℒ1 𝐷𝑒𝑔 : 𝑥𝑔, 𝑥𝑠
ℒ𝑡ℎ𝑟: 𝐼1 𝑥𝑡 , 𝐸𝑛𝑡(𝑥𝑡) ℒ𝑎𝑑𝑣 1,2,3: 𝑦, ൗ
𝑥𝑡
′
𝑥𝑔 ℒ𝐹𝑀 𝐷𝑒𝑔 : 𝐼2,ℓ∙ 𝑥𝑠 , 𝐼2,ℓ∙ 𝑥𝑔
÷1,2,4
÷1,2,4
[139] ICFace:
𝑥𝑡
𝑎𝜂
To neutral Gen.
𝐻𝑛
To expression Gen.
𝐻𝑒
𝑥𝑠 𝐴𝑈𝐸 𝑎𝑠
s
𝑥𝑔
𝜂 𝑥𝑔
𝐷 𝑦𝐷
𝐴 𝑎𝑔/𝑎𝑠
𝐼
𝑥𝑡, 𝑥𝑡
𝜂
𝑥𝑔, 𝑥𝑡
𝜂s
OR
𝑥𝑡
′
𝑥𝑡
𝜂
ICFace
𝑥𝑡
𝑎𝜂
To neutral Gen.
𝐻𝑛
To expression Gen.
𝐻𝑒𝑥𝑠 𝐴𝑈𝐸 𝑎𝑠
s
𝑥𝑔
𝜂
𝑥𝑔
𝐷 𝑦𝐷
𝐴 𝑎𝑡
𝐷 𝑦𝐷
𝐴 𝑎𝑔
𝐼𝑥𝑡, 𝑥𝑡
𝜂
𝐼𝑥𝑔, 𝑥𝑡
𝜂
𝑥𝑡
′
𝑥𝑡
𝜂
𝑎: Action Units (AU), 𝜂: neutral expression
𝑎: Action Units (AU), 𝜂: neutral expression
s
ICFace
ℒ1: 𝑥𝑡 , 𝑥𝑔 ℒ1: 𝑥𝑔
𝜂
, 𝐻𝑒(𝑥𝑡
′, 𝑎𝜂) ℒ𝑎𝑑𝑣(𝑛): 𝑦, ൘
𝑥𝑔
𝜂
𝑥𝑡
𝜂 ℒ𝑎𝑑𝑣(𝑒): 𝑦, ൗ
𝑥𝑔
𝑥𝑡
′
ℒ2: 𝐴 𝑥𝑡 , 𝑎𝑠 ℒ2: 𝐴 𝑥𝑔 , 𝑎𝑠 ℒ2: 𝐴 𝑥𝑔
𝜂
, 𝑎𝜂 ℒ𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐(𝐼): 𝑥𝑡, 𝑥𝑡
𝜂
ℒ𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐(𝐼): 𝑥𝑔, 𝑥𝑡
𝜂
[44] AF-VAE:
𝑥𝑠 𝑏𝑠𝐵𝐸
𝐴𝑀𝐸: Additive Memory Encoder – models 𝑒𝑎 as a Gaussian mixture of clustered 
facial boundaries. 
𝐸𝑛1
𝐸𝑛2
𝑒𝑎
𝑒𝑥
𝐴𝑀𝐸 𝐷𝑒 𝑥𝑔
𝐼
𝑥𝑡
Appearance encoder
Identity encoder
AF-VAE
ℒ𝐾𝐿: 𝑥𝑔, 𝑒𝑎, 𝑒𝑥, 𝐴𝑀𝐸 ℒ𝐹𝑀 𝐼 : 𝑥𝑔, 𝑥𝑡
[51] wg-GAN:
𝑣𝑠𝑡: vector map of the warp from 𝑥𝑡 to 𝑥𝑠,  𝑤𝑠𝑡: 𝑥𝑡 warped according to 𝑣𝑠𝑡
Training: for each 𝑥𝑡
(𝑖)
, 𝑥𝑠 = 𝑥𝑡
(𝑖−10)
taken from the same video clip
𝐿𝐸
𝐿𝑇
𝑥𝑠 𝑥𝑡
𝑣𝑠𝑡
𝑤𝑠𝑡
Refinement
𝐻1 𝑥𝑔
𝑓 𝐻2 Blend 𝑥𝑔
Occlusion 
Inpainting
𝑥𝑔
′ 𝑓
𝐷1 𝐷2 𝑦2
𝐷3 𝑦3
𝑥𝑡
′ 𝑓
𝑚
𝑚
𝑥𝑡
′ 𝑓
𝑣𝑠𝑡
′
𝑓,𝑚
𝑚
wgGAN
𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑣1: ൘
𝑣𝑠𝑡
′ ,𝑥𝑡
′ 𝑓
𝑣𝑠𝑡,𝑥𝑔
𝑓 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑣2: 𝑦2, ൘
𝑥𝑡
′ 𝑓
𝑥𝑔
′ 𝑓 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑣3: 𝑦3, ൘
𝑥𝑡
′ 𝑚
𝑥𝑔
′ 𝑚
𝐿1: 𝑥𝑔
′ 𝑓
, 𝑥𝑡
𝑓
𝐿2: 𝑥𝑔
′ 𝑚 , 𝑥𝑡
′ 𝑚
[106] Motion&Texture-GAN:
𝑥𝜂: cropped neutral expression face, 𝑦𝑠: face expression label of source, 𝑠: an SRVF 
point on a spherical manifold, 𝐿𝑅: landmark reconstruction from 𝑠, 𝑙: facial landmarks
𝑥𝑡
𝜂
𝑧
𝑦𝑠
𝐺𝑀 𝑠𝑠
𝐺𝑇
𝐷𝑇 𝑦𝑇
𝐼1
𝐿𝑅
𝑙𝑔
(1)
⋮
𝑙𝑔
(𝑇)
𝐷𝑀 𝑦𝑀
𝑥𝑔
(1)
⋮
𝑥𝑔
(𝑇)
= 𝑋𝑔
𝑥𝑡
𝜂
𝑥𝑡
𝜂
𝑠𝑡
′
𝐺𝑇
𝑋𝑡
′
𝑋𝑡
VGG-face
Texture-GAN
Motion-GAN
⋮
⋮
Motion&Texture-GAN
σ𝑖=1
𝑇 ℒ1: 𝑥𝑡
′(𝑖)
, 𝑥𝑔
(𝑖) σ𝑖=1
𝑇 ℒ𝑎𝑑𝑣(𝑇): 𝑦𝑇 , ൘
𝑥𝑡
′(𝑖)
𝑥𝑔
(𝑖) σ𝑖=1
𝑇 ℒ𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐(𝐼): 𝑥𝑡
′(𝑖)
, 𝑥𝑔
(𝑖)
ℒ1: 𝑠𝑠 , 𝑠𝑡
′ ℒ𝑎𝑑𝑣(𝑀): 𝑦𝑆 , 𝑦𝑚, ൗ
𝑠𝑠
𝑠𝑡
′
[148] ImaGINator:
𝑥𝑡
(0)
𝑙: One-hot label encoding of expression, 𝑧: Random value 𝑧~𝑁(0,1)
𝐸𝑛𝑠 𝐷𝑒𝑒𝑡
𝑧
𝑙𝑠 𝑥𝑡
′(1)
, … 𝑥𝑡
′(𝑡)
𝑥𝑔
(1)
, … 𝑥𝑔
(𝑡)
𝐷𝐼 𝑦𝐼𝐷𝑉 𝑦𝑉
𝑥𝑡
′(𝑖)
𝑥𝑔
(𝑖)
𝑙𝑠
Image Disc.Video Disc.
ImaGINator
ℒ1: 𝑥𝑡
′(1)
, … 𝑥𝑡
′(𝑡)
, 𝑥𝑔
(1)
, … 𝑥𝑔
(𝑡)
ℒ𝑎𝑑𝑣(𝑉): 𝑦𝑣 , 𝑙𝑠, 𝑥𝑡
′(1)
, … , 𝑥𝑔
(1)
, …
ℒ𝑎𝑑𝑣(𝐼): 𝑦𝐼 , 𝑥𝑡
′(𝑖)
, 𝑥𝑔
(𝑖)
Fig. 7. Architectural schematics of reenactment networks. Black lines indicate prediction flows used during
deployment, dashed gray lines indicate dataflows performed during training. Zoom in for more detail.
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[123] Monkey-NET:
𝑥𝑠
𝑥𝑡
(𝑖)
Keypoint Detector
𝐾
Motion Transfer Gen.
𝑀
𝑘𝑠
𝑘𝑡
𝑣𝑠𝑡
𝑣𝑠𝑡
′ 𝑥𝑠𝑡
′c Warp
𝑚𝑠𝑡
𝑣𝑟𝑒𝑠
𝐸𝑛 𝑒𝑠 𝐷𝑒
Motion Network
𝑥𝑔
𝑣𝑠𝑡
′
∑
𝑣𝑐𝑜𝑟
𝑣𝑔
𝐷 𝑦𝑘𝑡
𝑥𝑡
(𝑖)
𝑘: 2D matrix of keypoints, 𝑣: vector field, 𝑣𝑟𝑒𝑠, 𝑣𝑐𝑜𝑟: residual and coarse motion fields,  
𝑚: estimated motion mask 
Monkey-NET
ℒ𝑎𝑑𝑣: 𝑦, 𝑘𝑡 , ൗ
𝑥𝑔
𝑥𝑡
(𝑖) ℒ𝐹𝑀: 𝑥𝑔 ∙ 𝑣𝑠𝑡, 𝑥𝑡
(𝑖)
∙ 𝑣𝑠𝑡
[159] Neural Talking Heads:
𝐿𝐸𝑥𝑠 𝑙𝑠 𝐺 𝑥𝑔
𝐷 𝑦
𝑥𝑡
(1) 𝐿𝐸 𝑙𝑠
(1) 𝐸𝑛
⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮
𝐸𝑛
∑
1
𝑘
𝑥𝑡
(𝑘) 𝐿𝐸 𝑙𝑠
(𝑘)
AdaIN
𝑥𝑡
′ 𝐼
Neural Talking Heads
ℒ𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐 𝐼 : 𝑥𝑠, 𝑥𝑔 ℒ𝑎𝑑𝑣: 𝑦, ൗ
𝑥𝑔
𝑥𝑡
′ ℒ𝐹𝑀: 𝐷ℓ∗ 𝑥𝑡
′, 𝑙𝑡 , 𝐷ℓ∗ 𝑥𝑔, 𝑙𝑔 ℒℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑒: 𝐷, 𝑥𝑔, 𝑥𝑡
′
[55] MarioNETte:
𝑥𝑠
𝑥𝑡
(𝐾)
𝑙𝑠
𝑙𝑡𝑠
(𝐾)
𝐸𝑛𝑠 𝑒𝑠
… 𝑙𝑡𝑠
(𝑖)
…𝑥𝑡
(𝑖)
𝑣𝑡
(𝐾)
𝑤𝑡
(𝐾)
𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑥𝑔
𝑦𝑡
𝐷𝑒
𝐷
𝐼1
𝐼2
𝐼𝐴𝐵
𝑥𝑠
Source encoder
Target encoder
𝑙𝑠𝑡: 𝑡’s landmarks with 𝑠’s expression,  𝑣: feature maps,    𝑤:  warped feature maps
𝐼𝐴𝐵: Image Attention Block
𝐸𝑛𝑡
𝑥𝑠 , 𝑥𝑡 , 𝑥𝑔: The source, target, and generated images (e.g., portraits)
𝑦: a label (e.g., fake vs real, one-hot encoding, …)
𝑥′: another sample from the same distribution, ො𝑥: reconstructed, 𝑥∗: generated
𝑚: a binary mask, 𝑠: a segmentation map
: crop out region 𝑎 from image where 𝑎 ∈ {f:face, e:eye, m:mouth}
: create mask using region 𝑎 of the image where 𝑎 ∈ {f:face, e:eye, m:mouth}
: concatenate 
𝑥 𝑎 : image 𝑥 cropped to the region of 𝑎 ∈ {𝑓:face, 𝑒:eye, 𝑚:mouth}
: Spatial replication of a vector (channel-wise or dim-wise)
𝐿𝐸, 𝐵𝐸, 𝐴𝐸, 3𝐷𝐸: Landmark, Boundary, Action Unit (AU), 
and 3DMM facial model Extractors (open source CV library)
𝐿𝑇, 3𝐷𝑇: Landmark and 3D model transformers, from 𝑠 to 𝑡
𝑀𝐸: MFCC audio feature extractor
𝑎
𝑎
s
𝐿𝑇𝐿𝐸
: Scale image down by factor of X÷
x
MarioNETte
ℒ𝑎𝑑𝑣: 𝑙𝑠, 𝑦𝑡 , 𝑥𝑔, 𝑥𝑠 ℒ𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐: 𝐼1,ℓ∙ 𝑥𝑔 , 𝐼1,ℓ∙ 𝑥𝑠 ℒ𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐: 𝐼2,ℓ∙ 𝑥𝑔 , 𝐼2,ℓ∙ 𝑥𝑠
ℒ𝐹𝑀: 𝐷ℓ 𝑥𝑔 , 𝐷ℓ 𝑥𝑠 ℒ𝑚𝑠𝑒: 𝐿𝑀𝑇
[89] Liu et al. 2019:
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Liu et al. 2019
ℒ𝐹𝑀 𝐷2 : 𝐶𝑔, 𝑋𝑔 , 𝐶𝑔, 𝑋𝑡 ℒ𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐(𝐼): 𝑋𝑔, 𝑋𝑡 ℒ𝑎𝑑𝑣1: 𝑦1, ൗ
𝑏𝑡
′
𝑏𝑔
, 𝑎𝑠
ℒ𝑎𝑑𝑣2: 𝑦2, 𝐶𝑔, 𝑋𝑔 , 𝐶𝑔, 𝑋𝑡 ℒ1: 𝑏𝑔, 𝑏𝑡
Fig. 8. Architectural schematics of the eenactm nt netw rks. Bla k lines indicate prediction flows used
during deployment, dashed gray lines indicate dataflows performed during training. Zoom in for more detail.
to pix2pixHD, a progressive training strategy is to generate high resolution imagery. In their
evaluations, the authors demonstrate facial reenactment using the source’s facial boundaries.
Following the contextual approach, the auth rs of [70] devised a GAN which performs complete
facial reenactment (gaze, blinking, pose, mouth, etc.), training on only one minute of video. Their
approach was to extract the source and target’s 3D facial models from 2D images using monocular
reconstruction, and then for each frame, (1) transfer the facial pose and expression of the source’s
3D model to the target’s, and (2) produce xд with a modified pix2pix framework, using the last 11
frames of rendered heads, UV maps, and gaze masks as the input.
4.1.3 Many-to-Many (Multiple IDs to Multiple IDs). The first attempts at identity agnostic models
were made in 2017, where the authors of [105] used a conditional GAN (CGAN) for the task. Their
approach was to (1) extract the inner-face regions as (xt ,xs ), and then (2) pass them an ED to
produce xд subjected to L1 and Ladv losses. The challenge of using a CGAN was that the training
data had to be paired (images of different identities with the same expression).
Going one step further, in [166] the authors reenacted full portraits at low resolutions. Their
approach was to decouple the identities with a conditional adversarial autoencoder, disentangling
the identity from the expression in the latent space. However, their approach is limited to driving
xt with discreet AU expression labels (fixed expressions) that capture xs . A similar label based
reenactment was presented in the evaluation of StarGAN [27], an architecture similar to CycleGAN
but for N domains (poses, expressions, etc).
Later, in 2018, the authors of [108] suggested to drive xt with continuous action units (AU) as an
input, extracted from xs . Their generator, GATH, is an ED network trained on the loss signals from
using three other networks: (1) a discriminator, (2) an identity classifier, and (3) a pretrained AU
estimator. The classifier shares the same hidden weights as the discriminator to disentangle the
identity from the expressions.
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Self-Attention Modeling. Similar to [108], another work called GANimation [109] reenacted
faces through AU value inputs estimated from xs . Their architecture uses an AU based generator
that uses a self-attention model to handle occlusions, and mitigate other artifacts. Furthermore,
another network penalizes G with an expression prediction loss, and shares its weights with the
discriminator to encourage realistic expressions. Similar to CycleGAN, GANimation uses a cycle
consistency loss which eliminates the need for image pairing.
Instead of relying on AU estimations, the authors of [114] propose GANnotation which generates
xд based on (xt , ls ), where ls denotes the facial landmarks of xs . GANnotation uses the same
self-attention model as GANimation, but considers a novel “triple consistency loss” to minimize
artifacts in xд . The loss teaches the network how to deal with intermediate poses/expressions not
found in the training set. Given ls , lt and lz sampled randomly from the same video, the loss is
computed as
Ltr ip = ∥G(xt , ls ) −G(G(xt , lz ), ls )∥2 (4)
3D Parametric Approaches. Concurrent to the work of [70], other works also leveraged 3D
parametric facial models to prevent identity leakage in the generation process. In [120], the authors
reenact t at oblique poses and high resolution. Their framework, FaceID-GAN, is an ED generator
trained in tandem with a 3DMM face model predictor, where the model parameters of xt are used
to transform xs before being joined with the encoder’s embedding. To prevent identity leakage
from xs to xд , FaceID-GAN incorporates an identification classifier within the adversarial game.
The classifier has 2N outputs, where the first N outputs (corresponding to training set identities)
are activated if the input is real and the rest are activated if it is fake.
Later, the authors of [120] advanced FaceID-GAN with FaceFeat-GAN which improves the
diversity of the faces while preserving the identity [121]. Their approach was to use a set of GANs
to learn facial feature distributions as encodings, and then use these generators to create new content
with a decoder. Unfortunately, the feature GANs’ input seeds must be selected empirically to fit xs .
Instead of passing the 3DMM parameters to the network, one can use the network to refine the
realism of a 3D head rendering. paGAN [96] follows this approach, and only needs a single image of
the target as input. An expression neutral image of xt is used to generate a 3D model which is then
driven by xs . The driven 3D model is used to create inputs for a U-Net generator: the rendered head,
its UV map, its depth map, a masked image of xt for texture, and a 2D mask indicating the gaze of xs .
Using Multi-Modal Sources. In the work of [149], the authors developed X2Face which can reen-
act xt with xs or some other modality such as audio or a pose vector. X2Face uses two ED networks:
an embedding network and a driving network. First, the embedding network encodes 1-3 examples of
the target’s face tovt : the optical flow field required to transform xt to a neutral pose and expression.
Next, xt is interpolated according tomt producing x
′
t . Finally, the driving network maps xs to the
vector mapvs , crafted to interpolate x
′
t to xд , having the pose and expression of xs . During training,
firstL1 loss is used betweenxt andxд , and then an identity loss is used betweenxs andxд using a pre-
trained identitymodel trained on the VGG-Face Dataset. All interpolation is performedwith a tensor-
flow interpolation layer to enable back propagation using x ′t and xд . The authors also showed how
the embedding of the driving network can be mapped to other modalities such as audio and pose.
In 2019, nearly all works pursued identity agnostic models:
Facial Landmark & Boundary Conversion. To mitigate the issue of identity leakage from
facial landmarks, the authors of [161], convert the source’s intermediate facial representation
to the target’s before passing it through the generator. Their framework, called FaceSwapNet.
accomplished this by using two encoders and a decoder to transfer the expression in landmark ls
to the face structure of lt , denoted lд . Then a generator network is used to convert xt to xд , where
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lд is injected into the network with AdaIn layers like a Style-GAN. The authors found that it is
crucial to use triplet perceptual loss with an external VGG network.
Another work which transforms facial representations is FSGAN [103], a GAN pipeline which
can perform facial reenactment and replacement while handling occlusions. For reenactment
a pix2pixHD generator receives xt and the source’s 3D facial landmarks ls , represented as a
256x256x70 image (one channel for each of the 70 landmarks). The output is xд and its segmenta-
tion mapmд with three channels (background, face, and hair). The generator is trained recurrently
where each output is passed back as input for several iterations while ls is interpolated incremen-
tally from ls to lt . To improve results further, delaunay Triangulation and barycentric coordinate
interpolation are used to generate content similar to the target’s pose. In their evaluations they
achieve real time reenactment at 30fps.
Often, the quality of xд degrades when xs is at oblique angles. To counter this issue, [49] sug-
gested using a set of networks encode the source’s pose, expression, and the target’s facial boundary
for a decoder that generates the reenacted boundary bд . Finally, an ED network generates xд using
an encoding of xt ’s texture in its embedding. A multi-scale loss is used to improve quality and the
authors utilized a small labeled dataset by training their model in a semi-supervised way.
Latent Space Manipulation. When using ED networks, the latent (or encoded) space can be
manipulated to control the decoder’s output. The authors of [139] utilized this fact in a framework
called ICFace, which enables the user to drive the target’s expression, pose, mouth, eyes, and
eyebrows independently. Their architecture is similar to a CycleGAN in that one generator translates
xt into a neutral expression domain as xηt and another generator translates x
η
t into an expression
domain as xд . Both generators are conditioned on the target AU.
Variational Auto-encoders are a natural choice to controlling the latent space of an ED. For the
task of facial reenactment, the authors of [44] proposed the Additive Focal Variational Auto-encoder
(AF-VAE). Their model separates a C-VAE’s latent code into an appearance encoding ea and identity-
agnostic expression coding ex . To capture a wide variety of factors in ea (e.g., age, illumination,
complexion, ...), the authors used an additive memory module during training which conditions the
latent variables on a Gaussian mixture model, fitted to clustered set of facial boundaries. Subpixel
convolutions were used in the decoder to mitigate artifacts and improve fidelity.
Warp-based Approaches. In the past, facial reenactment was done by warping the image xt to
the landmarks ls [12]. In [51], the authors proposed wgGAN which uses the same approach but
creates high-fidelity facial expressions by refining the warped image though a series of GANs:
one for refining the warped face and another for in-painting the occlusions (eyes and mouth). A
challenge with wgGAN is that the warping process is sensitive to head motion (change in pose).
To handle large pose changes, [162] suggested that the xд should instead be blendedwith awarped
version. In their work the authors generated xд with a decoder using (1) an encoding of xt and (2)
a segmentation map of xs as reenactment guidance via SPADE residual blocks. Then a separate
network uses xд and the classical warped version to find a blending mask for joining them together.
Motion-Content Disentanglement. Several works noted that both motion (i.e., location tracking)
and content (e.g., textures) can be decoupled to help the network process new content. Similar to
MoCoGAN [141], the authors of [123] decoupled the source’s content and motion in a framework
called Monkey-Net. Monkey-Net is a self-supervised network for driving an image with an arbitrary
video sequence. First, a series of networks produce a motion heat map (optical flow) using the
source and target’s key-points, and then an ED generator produces xд using xs and the optical flow
(in its embedding).
, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article . Publication date: May 2020.
16 Mirsky, et al.
Later, in [124], the authors extended Monkey-Net by improving the object appearance when large
pose transformations occur. They accomplished this by (1) modeling motion around the keypoints
using affine transformations, (2) updating the key-point loss function accordingly, and (3) having
the motion generator predict an occlusion mask on the preceding frame for in-painting inference.
In contrast to MoCoGAN [141] the authors of [148] proposed ImaGINator: a conditional GAN
which fuses both motion and content. Their GAN uses transposed 3D convolutions to capture the
distinct spatio-temporal relationships. The GAN also uses a temporal discriminator, and to increase
diversity, the authors train the temporal discriminator with some videos using the wrong label. A
disadvantage of [106] and [148] is that they are label driven and generating a fixed number of frames.
The authors of [106] had a different approach to motion-content disentanglement. There, the
authors attempt to reenact neutral expression faces with smoother animations than previous works.
The authors described the animations as temporal curves in 2D space, summarized as points on a
spherical manifold by calculating their square-root velocity function (SRVF). A WGAN is used to
complete this distribution given target expression labels, and a pix2pix GAN is used to convert the
sequences of reconstructed landmarks into a video frames of the target.
4.1.4 Few-Shot Learning. Towards the end of 2019 and into the beginning of 2020, researchers
began looking for ways to minimize the amount of required training data, using techniques such
as one-shot and few-shot learning.
In [159], the authors developed a few-shot reenatcment model which works well at oblique
angles. To accomplish this, the authors performed meta-transfer learning, where the network is first
trained on many different identities and then fine-tuned on the target’s identity. Then, an identity
encoding of xt is obtained by averaging the encodings of k sets of (xt , lt ). Then a pix2pix GAN is
used to generate xд using ls as an input, and the identity encoding via AdaIN layers. Unfortunately,
the authors note that their method is sensitive to identity leakage.
To obtain temporal few-shot learning, the authors of Vid2Vid (Section 4.1.2) extended their work
in [145]. They used a network weight generation module which utilizes an attention mechanism.
The module learns to extract appearance patterns from a few sample xt which are injected into
the video synthesis layers.
Often, the quality xд is poor in a few-shot setting when xs has a different pose then the reference
image(s) inXt . To alleviate identity leakage in these cases, the authors of [55] developedMarioNETte.
In contrast to other works which encode the identity separately or use of AdaIN layers, MarioNETte
uses an image attention block and target feature alignment. This enables the model to better handle
the differences between face structures. Finally, the identity is also preserved using a novel landmark
transformer inspired by [20].
4.2 Mouth Reenactment (Dubbing)
In contrast to expression reenactment, mouth reenactment (a.k.a., video or image dubbing) drives a
target’s mouth with a segment of audio. Fig. 9 presents the relevant schematics for this section.
4.2.1 Many-to-One (Multiple Identities to a Single Identity). Obama Puppetry. In 2017, the
authors of [131] created a realistic reenactment of former President Obama. This was accomplished
by (1) using a time delayed RNN over MFCC audio segments to generate a sequence of mouth
landmarks (shapes), (2) generating the mouth textures (nose and mouth) by applying a weighted
median to images with similar mouth shapes via PCA-space similarity, (3) refining the teeth
by transferring the high-frequency details from other frames into the target video, and (4) using
dynamic programming to re-time the target video to match the source audio and blend the texture in.
Later that year, the authors of [76] presented ObamaNet: a network that reenacts an individual’s
mouth and voice using text as input. The process is to (1) convert the source text to audio using
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[131] Synthesizing Obama:
𝑎 𝑖 : the 𝑖-th 25ms segment of audio with a stride of 10ms.   𝑀𝑅: mouth retrieval and 
enhancement based on 3DMM reconstructions.   𝑂𝐹: optical flow extractor
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𝑡𝑠: text to be inserted into speech.   𝑇23𝐷: A 3DMM video renderer based on 𝑡𝑠 using a 
viseme lookup on 𝑡.    *Audio gen not shown (TTS is done procedurally) .
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𝑎(𝑖): the 𝑖-th 33ms segment of audio.   𝑝: lip landmarks.
SD-CGAN
ℒ𝑎𝑑𝑣: 𝑦, 𝑒𝐼 , ൗ
𝑝𝑡, 𝑥𝑡
𝑝𝑔, 𝑥𝑔 ℒ𝑀𝑆𝐸 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝑀 :𝑝𝑡 , 𝑢𝑡
[133] Neural Voice Puppetry:
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𝑝: landmarks compressed with PCA.   𝑎(𝑖): 10ms of audio around the 𝑖-th frame.  
𝑚𝑎: attention map.     𝑚𝑤: motion map.
ATVGnet
ℒ𝑝𝑖𝑥 𝐵, 𝐶 : 𝑥𝑔, 𝑥𝑡 , 𝑚𝑎2
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Fig. 9. Architectural schematics for somemouth reenactment networks. Black lines indicate prediction
flows used during deployment, dashed gray lines indicate dataflows performed during training.
Char2Wav [127], (2) generate a sequence of mouth-keypoints using a time-delayed LSTM on the
audio, and (3) use a U-Net CNN to perform in-painting on a composite of the target video frame
with a masked mouth and overlayed keypoints.
Later in 2018, Jalalifar et al. [63] created a network that synthesizes the entire head portrait of
Obama, and therefore does not require pose re-timing like [76, 131]. First, a bidirectional LSTM
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coverts MFCC audio segments into sequence of mouth landmarks, and then a pix2pix like network
generates frames using the landmarks and a noise signal. After training, the pix2pix network is
fine-tuned using a single video of the target to ensure consistent textures.
3D Parametric Approaches. Later in 2019, the authors of [48] proposed a method for editing a
transcript of a talking heads which, in turn, modifies the target’s mouth and speech accordingly.
The approach is to (1) align phenomes to as , (2) fit a 3D parametric head model to each frame of
Xt like [70], (3) blend matching phenomes to create any new audio content, (4) animate the head
model with the respective frames used during the blending process, and (5) generate Xд with a
CGAN RNN using composites as inputs (rendered mouths placed over the original frame).
The authors of [133] had a different approach: (1) animate a the reconstructed 3D head with the
predicted blend shape parameters from as using a DeepSpeech model for feature extraction, (2)
use Deferred Neural Rendering [134] to generate the mouth region, and then (3) use a network to
blend the mouth into the original frame. The authors found that their approach only requires 2-3
minutes of video of the target to produce very realistic results.
4.2.2 Many-to-Many (Multiple IDs to Multiple IDs). One of the first works to perform identity
agnostic video dubbing was [122]. There, the authors used an LSTM to map MFCC audio segments
to the face shape. The face shapes were represented as the coefficients of an active appearance
model (AAM), which were then used to retrieve the correct face shape of the target.
Improvements in Lip-sync. Noting a human’s sensitivity to temporal coherence, the authors of
[126] use a GAN with three discriminators: on the frames, video, and lip-sync. Frames are generated
by (1) encoding each MFCC audio segment a(i)s and xt with separate encoders, (2) passing the
encodings through an RNN, and (3) decoding the outputs as x (i)д using a decoder.
Since the audio is processed in segments, lip-sync artifacts can occur. The authors of [155] tried
to mitigate this issue by adding a textual context. There, a time-delayed LSTM was used to predict
mouth landmarks given MFCC segments and the spoken text using a text-to-speech model. The
target frames were then converted into sketches using an edge filter and the predicted mouth
shapes were composited into them. Finally, a pix2pix like GAN with self-attention was used to
generate the frames with both video and image conditional discriminators.
The authors of [25] stated that direct models are problematic since the model learns irrelevant
correlations between the audiovisual signal and the speech content. To avoid this issue, an LSTM
audio-to-landmark network and a landmark-to-identity CNN-RNN are used in sequence, where
the facial landmarks are compressed with PCA and the attention mechanism from [109] is used. To
improve synchronization, the authors recommended using a regression based discriminator which
considers both sequence and content information.
EDs for Preventing Identity Leakage. The authors in [165] mitigated identity leakage by dis-
entangling the speech and identity latent spaces using adversarial classifiers. Since their speech
encoder is trained to project audio and video into the same latent space, the authors showed how
xд can be driven using xs or as .
In [64], the authors proposed Speech2Vid which also uses separate encoders for audio and
identity. However, to capture the identity better, the identity encoder EnI uses a concatenation of
five images of the target, and there are skip connections from the EnI to the decoder. To blend the
mouth in better, a third ‘context’ encoder is used to encourage in-painting. Finally, a VDSR CNN is
applied to xд to sharpen the image.
In [142], the authors developed a dubbing network which can also generate facial expressions
and blinking. Their approach was to generate frames with a stride transposed CNN decoder on
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GRU-generated noise, in addition to the audio and identity encodings. Their video discriminator
uses two RNNs for both the audio and video.
Later in [143], the same authors improved the temporal coherence by splitting the video discrim-
inator into two: (1) for temporal realism in mouth to audio synchronization, and (2) for temporal
realism in overall facial expressions. Then in [67], the authors tuned their approach further by
fusing the encodings (audio, identity, and noise) with a polynomial fusion layer as opposed to
simply concatenating the encodings together. Doing so makes the network less sensitive to large
facial motions compared to [143] and [64].
4.3 Pose Reenactment
Most deep learning works in this domain focus on the problem of face frontalization.However,
there are some works which focus on facial pose reenactment.
In [60] the authors used a U-Net to convert (xt , lt , ls ) into xд using a GANwith two discriminators:
one conditioned with the neutral pose image, and the other conditioned with the landmarks. In
[138], the authors considered another approach for the task of pose-invariant face recognition.
Their pipeline, called DR-GAN, uses an ED GAN which encodes xt as et and then decodes (et ,ps , z)
as xд , where ps is the sources pose vector and z is a noise vector. The authors showed that the
quality of xд can be improved by averaging multiple examples of the identity encoding before
passing it through the decoder. In [22], the authors suggested using two GANs: The first frontalizes
the face and produces a UV map, and the second rotates the face, given the target angle as an
injected embedding.
4.4 Gaze Reenactment
There are only a few deep learning works which have focused on gaze reenactment. In [50] the
authors converted a cropped eye xt , its landmarks, and the source angle, to a flow (vector) field
using a 2-scale CNN. xд is then generated by applying a flow field to xt to warping it to the source
angle. The authors then corrected the illumination of xд with a second CNN. In [157], the authors
published the Gaze Redirection Network (GRN). The target’s cropped eye, head pose, and source
angle are encoded separately and then passed though an ED network to generate an optical flow
field. The field is used to warp xt into xд . To overcome the lack of training data and the challenge of
data pairing, the authors (1) pre-trained their network on 3D synthesized examples, (2) further tuned
their network on real images, and then (3) fine-tuned their network on 3-10 examples of the target.
4.5 Body Reenactment
Several facial reenactment papers from Section 4.1 discuss body reenactment as well, including:
Vid2Vid [145, 146], MocoGAN [141], and others [123, 124]. In this section, we focus on methods
which specifically target body reenactment. Schematics for some of these architectures can be
found in Fig. 10.
4.5.1 One-to-One (Identity to Identity). In the work [89], the authors performed facial reenact-
ment with the upper-body as well (arms and hands). The approach is to (1) use a pix2pixHD GAN
to convert the source’s facial boundaries to the targets, (2) paste them onto a captured pose skeleton
of the source, and then (3) use a pix2pixHD GAN to generate xд from the composite.
4.5.2 Many-to-One (Multiple Identities to a Single Identity). Dance Reenactment. In [23] the
authors made people dance using a target specific pix2pixHD GANwith a custom loss function. The
generator receives an image of the captured pose skeleton and the discriminator receives the current
and last image conditioned on their poses. The quality of face is then improved with a residual
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Fig. 10. Architectural schematics for some body reenactment networks. Black lines indicate prediction
flows used during deployment, dashed gray lines indicate dataflows performed during training.
predicted by an additional pix2pixHD GAN, given the face region of the pose. A many-to-one
relationship is achieved by normalizing the input pose to that of the target’s.
In some cases, the method of [23] would produce artifacts such as stretched limbs due to in-
correctly detected pose skeletons. To mitigate for this, the authors of [88] used photogrammetry
software on hundreds of images of the target, and then reenacted the 3D rendering of the target’s
body. The rendering, partitioned depth map, and background are then passed to a pix2pix model
for image generation, using an attention loss.
Further artifacts can occur when a body reenactment network attempts to generating poses
which were unseen training. The authors of [2] alleviate this issue by having the network generalize
to many other than s and t . This was accomplished by first training the GAN on paired data (the
same identity doing different poses) and then later adding another discriminator that evaluates the
temporal coherence given (1) x (i)д driven by another video, and (2) the optical flow predicted version.
To reduce the amount of training content for the target, the authors of [167] proposed a method
that only requires three minutes of video: First, the target’s body are segmented by limb and the
pieces are oriented to the source’s pose. Then a pix2pixHD GAN uses this composition and the last
k frames’ poses to generate the body. Finally, another pix2pixHD GAN is used to blend the body
into the background.
4.5.3 Many-to-Many (Multiple IDs to Multiple IDs). Pose Alignment. Sometimes there are
issues of misalignment when using translation networks, such as pix2pix, for reenactment. To
resolve this issue, the authors of [125] suggested the use of novel ‘deformable skip connections’
which orients the shuttled feature maps according to the source pose. The authors also used a novel
nearest neighbor loss instead of using L1 or L2 losses. To modify unseen identities at test time, the
authors pass an encoding of xt to the decoder’s inner layers.
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To ensure that patterns, shapes, and textures are mapped realistically between frames, the au-
thors of [169] developed a GAN which uses novel Pose-Attentional Transfer blocks (PATB) inside
the generator. The architecture passes xt and the poses ps concatenated with pt through separate
encoders which are passed though a series of PATBs before being decoded. The PATBs progressively
transfer regional information of the poses to regions of the image to ultimately create a body that
has better shape and appearance consistency.
PoseWarping. Similar to the image warping techniques used for facial reenactment, some authors
also tried to reenact bodies. For example, in [99] the authors used a pre-trained DensePose network
[9] to refine a predicted pose with a warped and in-painted DensePose UV spatial map of the target.
Since the spatial map covers all surfaces of the body, the generated image has improved texture
consistency. Another example is [158] where the authors proposed DwNet. There the authors tried
to alleviate misalignment artifacts between xs and xt by using warping. To accomplish this, the
authors used a ‘warp module’ in an ED network to encode x (i−1)t warped to p
(i)
s , where p is a UV
body map of a pose obtained a DensePose network.
Background Foreground Compositing. Some researchers noticed that the background of a
video interferes with the generated foreground, and can contains temporal distortions. Therefore,
some works used segmentation and compositions to focus the network on the relevant components.
In [13], the authors broke the process down into three stages, trained end-to-end: (1) use a U-Net
to segment xt ’s body parts and then orient them according to the source pose ps , (2) use a second
U-Net to generate the body xд from the composite, and (3) use a third U-Net to perform in-painting
on the background and paste xд into it.
The authors of [42] used an ED GAN network to disentangle the foreground appearance (body),
background appearance, and pose to gain control each of these aspects. This is accomplished by
segmenting each of these aspects before passing them through encoders. In [32] the authors used a
CVAE-GAN, conditioned on heatmaps of the detected pose and skeleton. As a result, the authors
were able to change the pose and appearance of bodies individually.
4.5.4 Few-Shot Learning. In [78], the authors demonstrated the few-shot learning technique of
[46] on a pix2pixHD network and the network of [13]. Using just a few sample images, they were
able to transfer the resemblance of a target to new videos in the wild.
5 REPLACEMENT
The network schematics and summary of works for replacement deepfakes can be found in Fig. 12
and Table 2 respectively.
5.1 Swap
At first, face swapping was a manual process accomplished using tools such as Photoshop. More
automated systems first appeared between 2004-08 in [19] and [17]. Later, fully automated methods
were proposed in [31, 68] and [104] using methods such as warping and reconstructed 3Dmorphable
face models.
5.1.1 One-to-One (Identity to Identity).
Online Communities. After the Reddit user ‘deepfakes’ was exposed in the media, researchers
and online communities began finding improved ways to perform face swapping with deep neural
networks. The original deepfake network, published by the Reddit user, is an ED network. The
architecture consists of one encoder En and two decoders Des and Det . The components are trained
concurrently as two autoencoders: Des (En(xs )) = xˆs and Det (En(xt )) = xˆt , where x is a cropped
, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article . Publication date: May 2020.
22 Mirsky, et al.
𝑥𝑠
𝑥𝑡
𝑥𝑠
𝑓
𝑥𝑡
𝑓
f
f 𝐸𝑛
𝐷𝑒𝑠
𝐷𝑒𝑡
OR
ො𝑥𝑡
𝑓
ො𝑥𝑠
𝑓
𝑒𝑠
𝑒𝑡
𝐸𝑛 𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑔𝑥𝑡 𝑥𝑡
𝑓
f
ො𝑥𝑔
𝑓 p 𝑥𝑔
Basic Losses:
ℒ1(𝐸𝑛, 𝐷𝑒𝑠): ො𝑥𝑠
𝑓
, 𝑥𝑠
𝑓
ℒ1 𝐸𝑛,𝐷𝑒𝑡 : ො𝑥𝑡
𝑓
, 𝑥𝑡
𝑓
DeepFaceLab (2019):
ℒ2 𝐸𝑛, 𝐷𝑒𝑠 : 𝐵𝑙𝑢𝑟 𝑚𝑠
𝑓
∙ 𝑥𝑠
𝑓
, 𝐵𝑙𝑢𝑟 𝑚𝑡
𝑓
∙ 𝑥𝑡
𝑓
ℒ2 𝐸𝑛, 𝐷𝑒𝑡 : 𝐵𝑙𝑢𝑟 𝑚𝑠
𝑓
∙ 𝑥𝑠
𝑓
, 𝐵𝑙𝑢𝑟 𝑚𝑡
𝑓
∙ 𝑥𝑡
𝑓
Fig. 11. The basic schematic for the Reddit ‘deepfakes’ model and its variants[1, 61, 118].
face image. As a result, En learns to map s and t to a shared latent space, such that
Des (En(xt )) = xд (5)
Currently, there are a number of open-source face swapping tools on GitHub based on the original
network. One of the most popular is DeepFaceLab [61]. Their current version offers a wide variety
of model configurations, including adversarial training, residual blocks, a style transfer loss, and
masked loss to improve the quality of the face and eyes. To help the network map the target’s
identity into arbitrary face shapes, the training set is augmented with random face warps.
Another tool called FaceSwap-GAN [118] follows a similar architecture, but uses a denoising
autoencoder with a self-attention mechanisms, and offers cycle-consistency loss. The decoders in
FaceSwap-GAN also generate segmentation masks which help the model handle occlusions and is
used to blend xд back into the target frame. Finally, [1] is another open-source tool that provides a
GUI. Their software comes with 10 popular implementations, including that of [61], and multiple
variations of the original Redit user’s code.
5.1.2 One-to-Many (Single Identity to Multiple Identities).
Some researchers tried to apply the technique of style transfer to perform a face swap. The concept
is that an individual’s identity can be captured as a style which can then be applied to other fitting
objects (heads). In [75], the authors applied this idea with a modified style transfer CNN, where the
content was xt and the style was the identity of xs . The process was to (1) align xt to a reference
xs , (2) transfer the identity of s to the image using a multi scale CNN, trained with style loss on
images of s , and (3) align the output to xt and blend the face back in with a segmentation mask.
5.1.3 Many-to-Many (Multiple IDs to Multiple IDs).
One of the first identity agnostic methods was [105], mentioned in Section 4.1.3. However, to train
the CGAN, one needs a dataset of paired faces with different identities having the same expression.
Disentanglement with EDs. A few works created many-to-many face swapping networks by
disentangling and then modifying an ED’s latent space. In [16] the apporach was to disentangle the
identity from the attributes (pose, hair, background, and lighting) during the training process. The
identity encodings were the last pooling layer of a face classifier, and the attribute encoder was
trained using a weighted L2 lossand a KL divergence loss to mitigate identity leakage. The authors
also showed that they can adjust attributes, expression, and pose via interpolation of the encodings.
In [130] the authors proposed a system for identity obfuscation which swaps xt ’s face with a
similar or different identity. An ED is used to predict the 3D head parameters with are then either
modified or replaced with the source’s. Finally, a GAN is used to in-paint the face of xt given the
head model parameters.
Disentanglement with VAEs. Other authors took the disentanglement concept further by using
VAEs. For example, the authors of [98] developed RSGAN: a VAE-GAN consisting of two VAEs and
a decoder. One VAE encodes the hair region and the other encodes the face region, where both are
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Table 2. Summary of Deep Learning Replacement Models
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[1] 2017 Deepfakes for All • 2k-5k portraits 1 2 0-1 0 • • • - portrait 256x256
[118] 2018 FaceSwap-GAN • 2k-5k portraits 1 2 2 1 • • • - portrait 256x256One-to-One
[61] 2018 DeepFaceLab • 2k-5k portraits 1 2 0-1 0 • • • - portrait 256x256
One-to-Many [75] 2017 Fast Face Swap • 60 portraits None 0 0 0 2 • • • • portrait portrait 256x256
[98] 2018 RSGAN • None None 4 3 2 1 • • portrait portrait 128x128
[97] 2018 FSNet • None None 3 4 5 0 • • • • portrait portrait 128x128
[16] 2018 OSIP-FS • None None 2 1 2 0 • • portrait portrait 128x128
[95] 2018 DepthNets • None None • 3 2 2 1 • • • portrait portrait 80x80
[103] 2018 FSGAN • None None • 4 4 3 1 • • • • • portrait portrait 256x256
[130] 2018 IO-FR • None None • 1 1 1 1 • • • portrait portrait 256x256
[119] 2019 FS Face Trans. • None None • 1 1 2 2 • • • portraits portrait 128x128
[151] 2019 IHPT • None None • 2 1 2 0 • • • cropped cropped 128x128
Many-to-Many
[80] 2019 FaceShifter • None None • 3 3 3 0 • • portrait portrait 256x256
conditioned on a predicted attribute vector c describing x . Since VAEs are used, the facial attributes
can be edited through c .
Another example is [97] where the authors created a VAE ED network called FSNet. FSNET is
run on xs and then xt , producing encodings for the face of xs and the landmarks of xt . To perform
a face swap, a generator receives the masked portrait of xt and performs in-painting on the masked
face. The generator uses the landmark encodings in its embedding layer. During training, randomly
generated faces are used with triplet loss on the encodings to preserve identities.
Face Occlusions. In many cases, xt or xs is partially covered with hair, a hand, or some other object.
This results in inconsistencies and artifacts in xд (e.g., varying eye color). To handle occlusions
during face swapping, the authors of [80] developed FaceShifter: First, the last layer of a face
recognition classifier is used to encode the identity of xs . Then the encoding is then passed to a
generator: a series of novel Adaptive Attentional Denormalization layers (AAD) inside ResBlocks.
The generator also receives localized information of xt (feature maps) via a U-Net’s decoding layers.
Finally, another network fixes occlusion artifiacts by considering the delta between xt and xˆt .
FSGAN [103], mentioned in Section 4.1.3, can both handle occlusions and perform face swaps.
After the face reenactment generator produces xr , a second network predicts the target’s segmenta-
tion maskmt . Then (x ⟨f ⟩r ,mt ) is passed to a third network that performs in-painting for occlusion
correction. Finally, a fourth network blends the corrected face into xt while considering ethnicity
and lighting.
5.1.4 Few-Shot Learning. The author of FaceSwap-GAN [118] also hosted a few-shot approach
online dubbed “One Model to Swap Them All” [119]. In this version, the generator receives
(x ⟨f ⟩s ,x ⟨f ⟩t ,mt ), where its encoder is conditioned on VGGFace2 features of xt using FC-AdaIN
layers, and its decoder is conditioned on xt and the face structuremt via layer concatenations and
SPADE-ResBlocks respectively. Two discriminators are used: one on image quality given the face
segmentation and the other on the identities.
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[118] Face Swap GAN:
𝑥𝑠
𝑥𝑡
𝑥𝑠
𝑓
𝑥𝑡
𝑓
f
f 𝐸𝑛OR 𝑚𝑡
𝑚𝑠
𝑒𝑠
𝑒𝑡
𝐸𝑛 𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑔𝑥𝑡 𝑥𝑡
𝑓
f
ො𝑥𝑔
𝑓 p 𝑥𝑔
Warp
Warp
ො𝑥𝑡
𝑓
ො𝑥𝑠
𝑓
𝑚: segmentation mask (face)
𝐷𝑠 𝑦𝑠
𝑥𝑠
′
𝐷𝑡
𝑦𝑡
𝑥𝑡
′
𝐼
VGG
𝑥𝑠
𝑓
𝑥𝑡
𝑓
𝐷𝑒𝑠
𝐷𝑒𝑡
Face Swap GAN
ℒ𝑎𝑑𝑣:
𝑥𝑠
𝑥𝑡
𝑥𝑠
𝑓
𝑥𝑡
𝑓
f
f 𝐸𝑛OR 𝑚𝑡
𝑚𝑠
𝑒𝑠
𝑒𝑡
𝐸𝑛 𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑔𝑥𝑡 𝑥𝑡
𝑓
f
ො𝑥𝑔
𝑓 p 𝑥𝑔
Warp
Warp
ො𝑥𝑡
𝑓
ො𝑥𝑠
𝑓
𝑚: segmentation mask (face)
𝐷𝑠 𝑦𝑠
𝑥𝑠
′
𝐷𝑡
𝑦𝑡
𝑥𝑡
′
𝐼
VGG
𝑥𝑠
𝑓
𝑥𝑡
𝑓
𝐷𝑒𝑠
𝐷𝑒𝑡
ℒ𝑡𝑣(𝑠): 𝑥𝑠
𝑓 ℒ𝑡𝑣(𝑡): 𝑥𝑡
𝑓 ℒ𝑀𝐴𝐸 : 𝑥𝑠
𝑒 , 𝑥𝑡
𝑒 ℒ𝑎𝑑𝑣(𝑠): 𝑦𝑠 , 𝑥𝑠
′/ො𝑥𝑠
𝑓
ℒ𝑎𝑑𝑣(𝑡): 𝑦𝑡 , 𝑥𝑡
′/ො𝑥𝑡
𝑓 ℒ1(𝑠): ො𝑥𝑠
𝑓 , 𝑥𝑠
𝑓 ℒ1(𝑡): ො𝑥𝑡
𝑓 , 𝑥𝑡
𝑓 ℒ𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐(𝑠): 𝐼ℓ∙ ො𝑥𝑠
𝑓 , 𝐼ℓ∙ 𝑥𝑠
𝑓
ℒ𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐(𝑡): 𝐼ℓ∙ ො𝑥𝑡
𝑓 , 𝐼ℓ∙ 𝑥𝑡
𝑓 ℒ𝑐𝑦𝑐(𝑠): 𝐺𝑡𝑠 𝐺𝑠𝑡 𝑥𝑠 , 𝑥𝑠 ℒ𝑐𝑦𝑐(𝑡): 𝐺𝑠𝑡 𝐺𝑡𝑠 𝑥𝑡 , 𝑥𝑡
[75] Fast Face Swap:
𝑥𝑠
𝑥𝑡
𝐿𝐸
Align
𝑙𝑠
Style Transfer Network
𝑥𝑡
∗
÷
÷
÷
÷
÷
2
2
2
2
2
𝑥𝑔
𝑓
𝐿
Light Measure 
Network
Siamese Network
𝑥𝑠
Fast Face Swap
ℒ𝑎𝑑𝑣:
𝑥𝑠
𝑥𝑡
𝐿𝐸
Align
𝑙𝑠
Style Transfer Network
𝑥𝑡
∗
÷
÷
÷
÷
÷
2
2
2
2
2
𝑥𝑔
𝑓
𝐿
Light Measure 
Network
Siamese Network
𝑥𝑠
ℒ𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐: 𝐿 𝑥𝑔
𝑓
, 𝐿 𝑥𝑠 ℒ𝑠𝑡𝑦𝑙𝑒: 𝑥𝑔
𝑓
, 𝑋𝑡
ℒ𝐹𝑀: 𝐿ℓ∙ 𝑥𝑔
𝑓
, 𝐿ℓ∙ 𝑥𝑠
𝑓
ℒ𝑡𝑣: 𝑥𝑔
𝑓
[16] OSIP-FS:
𝑥𝑠
𝑥𝑡 𝐸𝑛𝐴
𝐸𝑛𝐼
Identity Enc.
Attribute Enc.
𝑒𝑔
𝐴
𝑒𝑔
𝐼 𝐷𝑒 𝑥𝑔
𝐷𝐼 𝑦𝐼
𝐷 𝑦
Identity 
Discriminator 
𝑥′
OSIP-FS
ℒ𝑎𝑑𝑣:𝑥𝑠
𝑥𝑡 𝐸𝑛𝐴
𝐸𝑛𝐼
Identity Enc.
Attribute Enc.
𝑒𝑔
𝐴
𝑒𝑔
𝐼 𝐷𝑒 𝑥𝑔
𝐷𝐼 𝑦𝐼
𝐷 𝑦
Identity 
Discriminator 
𝑥′
ℒ𝐶𝐸 𝐸𝑛𝐼 : 𝑦𝐼 , 𝑥 ℒ2 𝐸𝑛𝐴 : 𝑥𝑔, 𝑥𝑡 -weighted                             ℒ𝐾𝐿: 𝑒
𝐴
ℒ𝑎𝑑𝑣 𝐷 : 𝑦, 𝑥𝑡/𝑥𝑔 ℒ𝐹𝑀 𝐷𝑒 :𝐷ℓ∙ 𝑥𝑔 , 𝐷ℓ∙(𝑥𝑡) ℒ𝐶𝐸(𝐷𝐼): 𝑦𝐼 , 𝑥
′/𝑥𝑔
ℒ𝐹𝑀 𝐷𝑒 :𝐷𝐼ℓ∙ 𝑥𝑔 , 𝐷𝐼ℓ∙(𝑥′)
[98] RSGAN:
Face VAE
Hair VAE
Attribute 
Predictor
𝐸𝑛ℎ1
𝐸𝑛ℎ2
𝑥𝑡
𝐶 𝑐𝑡
𝑧𝑡
ℎ
𝑒𝑡
ℎ
𝐷𝑒ℎ ො𝑥
ℎ
𝐸𝑛𝑓1
𝐸𝑛𝑓2
𝑥𝑠
𝐶 𝑐𝑡
𝑧𝑡
𝑓
𝑒𝑡
𝑓
𝐷𝑒𝑓 ො𝑥
𝑓 𝐷𝑒 𝑥𝑔
𝐷1 𝑦1
𝐷2 𝑦2
𝑥
𝑥
Global
Patch
𝑥 ℎ : Hair region
Face VAE
Hair VAEFSGAN
ℒ𝑎𝑑𝑣:
Attribute 
Predictor
𝐸𝑛ℎ1
𝐸𝑛ℎ2
𝑥𝑡
𝐶 𝑐𝑡
𝑧𝑡
ℎ
𝑒𝑡
ℎ
𝐷𝑒ℎ ො𝑥
ℎ
𝐸𝑛𝑓1
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𝑥𝑠
𝐶 𝑐𝑡
𝑧𝑡
𝑓
𝑒𝑡
𝑓
𝐷𝑒𝑓 ො𝑥
𝑓 𝐷𝑒 𝑥𝑔
𝐷1 𝑦1
𝐷2 𝑦2
𝑥
𝑥
Global
Patch
𝑥 ℎ : Hair region
ℒ1: 𝑥
𝑓 , ො𝑥 𝑓 ℒ1: 𝑥
ℎ , ො𝑥 ℎ ℒ1: 𝑥, ො𝑥 ℒ𝐾𝐿: 𝑥, 𝑐
ℒ𝑎𝑑𝑣 1: 𝑦, Τ
𝑥
𝑥𝑔 ℒ𝑎𝑑𝑣 2: 𝑦, Τ
𝑥
𝑥𝑔 ℒ𝐶𝐸 𝐶 : 𝑐, 𝑦𝑐
[97] FSNet:
ED Network (EN)
Face Encoder
𝑥
𝐸𝑛𝑓
𝐸𝑛𝑙
Landmark Enc.
𝑒 𝑓
𝑒 𝑙
𝑚 𝑓
𝑥 𝑓
𝑙
𝑥𝑡
𝑥𝑠
EN
EN
𝑚𝑡
𝑓
𝑒𝑠
𝑓
𝑙𝑡
𝐻1 𝑥𝑔𝑥𝑡
𝑓
𝐷 𝑦
𝐷𝑃 𝑦𝑃
Patch disc.
𝑥′
𝑥′
𝐷𝑒𝑚
𝐷𝑒𝑓
𝐷𝑒𝑙
𝐷𝑚 𝑦𝑚
𝐷𝑓 𝑦𝑓
𝐷𝑙 𝑦𝑙
𝑚′ 𝑓
𝑥′ 𝑓
𝑙′
FSNET ℒ𝑎𝑑𝑣:ED Network
Face Encoder
𝑥
𝐸𝑛𝑓
𝐸𝑛𝑙
Landmark Enc.
𝑒 𝑓
𝑒 𝑙
𝑚 𝑓
𝑥 𝑓
𝑙
𝑥𝑡
𝑥𝑠
ED N.
ED N.
𝑚𝑡
𝑓
𝑒𝑠
𝑓
𝑙𝑡
𝐻1 𝑥𝑔𝑥𝑡
𝑓
𝐷 𝑦
𝐷𝑃 𝑦𝑃
Patch disc.
𝑥′
𝑥′
𝐷𝑒𝑚
𝐷𝑒𝑓
𝐷𝑒𝑙
𝐷𝑚 𝑦𝑚
𝐷𝑓 𝑦𝑓
𝐷𝑙 𝑦𝑙
𝑚′ 𝑓
𝑥′ 𝑓
𝑙′
VAE Objectives: ℒ𝐶𝐸 𝐸𝐷 :𝑚
𝑓 , ෝ𝑚 𝑓 ℒ𝐶𝐸 𝐸𝐷 : 𝑙, መ𝑙 ℒ1 𝐸𝐷 : 𝑥
𝑓 , ො𝑥 𝑓 ℒ1 𝐸𝐷 : 𝑥
𝑓 ∙ 𝑚 𝑓 , ො𝑥 𝑓 ∙ 𝑚 𝑓
ℒ𝑎𝑑𝑣 𝐸𝐷 : 𝑦𝑚 , 𝑚
𝑓 /𝑚′ 𝑓 ℒ𝑎𝑑𝑣 𝐸𝐷 : 𝑦𝑓 , 𝑥
𝑓 /𝑥′ 𝑓 ℒ𝑎𝑑𝑣 𝐸𝐷 : 𝑦𝑙 , 𝑙/𝑙′
𝑓 ℒ𝑎𝑑𝑣: 𝑦, 𝑥
′/𝑥𝑔
ℒ𝑎𝑑𝑣,𝑃: 𝑦𝑃, 𝑥
′/𝑥𝑔 ℒ𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑝 𝐸𝐷 : (𝑥𝑡1, 𝑥𝑡2, 𝑥𝑠), (𝑥𝑔1, 𝑥𝑡1, 𝑥𝑠), (𝑥𝑔2, 𝑥𝑡2, 𝑥𝑠)
[80] FaceShifter:
𝑥𝑡
𝑥𝑠 𝐸𝑛𝐼
Identity Enc.
𝑒𝑠
𝐼
𝑦𝐼
Attribute Encoder
𝐻1
Face 
Recog. Net
∑𝐷𝑒 𝑥𝑔∗
-1
𝐻2
Occlusion Correction
𝑥𝑔
𝑥𝑡
′
𝐷1:3
÷1,2,4
𝑦1:3÷1,2,4
FaceShifter
ℒ𝑎𝑑𝑣:
𝑥𝑡
𝑥𝑠 𝐸𝑛𝐼
Identity Enc.
𝑒𝑠
𝐼
𝑦𝐼
Attribute Encoder
𝐻1
Face 
Recog. Net
∑𝐷𝑒 𝑥𝑔∗
-1
𝐻2
Occlusion Correction
𝑥𝑔
𝑥𝑡
′
𝐷1:3
÷1,2,4
𝑦1:3÷1,2,4
ℒ𝑎𝑑𝑣1: 𝑦1, ൗ
𝑥
𝑥𝑔
∗ ℒ𝑎𝑑𝑣2: 𝑦2, ൗ
𝑥
𝑥𝑔
∗ ℒ𝑎𝑑𝑣3: 𝑦3, ൗ
𝑥
𝑥𝑔
∗
ℒ𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝐷𝑒, 𝐻1 : 𝑒𝑠
𝐼 , 𝑒𝑔
𝐼 ℒ𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐 𝐷𝑒, 𝐻1 : 𝐻1 ℓ∙ 𝑥𝑡 , 𝐻1 ℓ∙ 𝑥𝑔
∗ ℒ2 𝐷𝑒, 𝐻1 : 𝑥𝑔, 𝑥𝑡 -if s=t
ℒ𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝐻2 : 𝑒𝑠
𝐼 , 𝑒𝑔
𝐼 ℒ1 𝐻2 : 𝑥𝑔, 𝑥𝑡 − 𝑥𝑔
∗ ℒ2 𝐻2 : 𝑥𝑔, 𝑥𝑡 -if s=t
[119] Few-Shot Face Translation:
Face Segmentation
𝑆
𝑥𝑠
𝑥𝑡 𝑚𝑡
𝐹
𝐻
VGGFace2
𝑥𝑔
𝐷1 𝑦1
𝐷2 𝑦2
𝑥𝑡
𝑚𝑡
𝑥𝑡
𝑥𝑠
𝑥𝑡
SPADE
AdaIN
Few-Shot Face Translation
ℒ𝑎𝑑𝑣:
Face Segmentation
𝑆
𝑥𝑠
𝑥𝑡 𝑚𝑡
𝐹
𝐻
VGGFace2
𝑥𝑔
𝐷1 𝑦1
𝐷2 𝑦2
𝑥𝑡
𝑚𝑡
𝑥𝑡
𝑥𝑠
𝑥𝑡
SPADE
AdaIN
Losses unknown: Training code was not released as of writing
[95] Depth Nets:
𝐸𝑛𝑥𝑠
𝑥𝑡 𝐸𝑛
𝑃
shared 
weights
𝐿𝐸
𝐿𝐸
𝑝𝑠𝑡
f
Warp
¬f
𝑥𝑠
𝑓
𝑥𝑠
𝑓 p
𝑥𝑔
𝑓
OpenGL
𝑥𝑔
∗ 𝐻𝑔𝑥 𝑥𝑔
𝐻𝑥𝑔
CycleGAN
𝐷∙
𝐷𝑡
𝑥𝑥𝑔
′∗
𝑥
𝑥𝑔
∗
ො𝑥𝑔
∗
Blend Repair
𝑝𝑠𝑡: affine transformation parameters and depth measures
Depth Nets ℒ𝑎𝑑𝑣:
𝐸𝑛𝑥𝑠
𝑥𝑡 𝐸𝑛
𝑃
shared 
weights
𝐿𝐸
𝑝𝑠𝑡
f
Warp
𝑥𝑠
𝑓
𝑥𝑔
𝑓
OpenGL
𝑥𝑔
∗ 𝐻𝑔𝑥 𝑥𝑔
𝐻𝑥𝑔
CycleGAN 𝐷𝑡
𝑥𝑥𝑔
′∗
𝑥
ො𝑥𝑔
∗
Blend Repair
𝑝𝑠𝑡
ℒ𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚(𝐸𝑛, 𝑃): 𝑝𝑠𝑡 ℒ𝑐𝑦𝑐 𝐻𝑔𝑥, 𝐻𝑥𝑔 : 𝑥𝑔
∗ , 𝑥 ℒ𝑎𝑑𝑣 𝐷𝑡 : 𝑦𝑡 , Τ
𝑥
𝑥𝑔 ℒ𝑎𝑑𝑣 𝐷∙ : 𝑦𝑡 , ൗ
𝑥𝑔
′∗
𝑥𝑔
∗
[151] IHPT:
𝑥𝑠
𝑥𝑡 𝐸𝑛𝑝
𝐸𝑛𝐼
Identity Enc.
Pose Enc.
𝑒𝑡
𝑝
𝑒𝑠
𝐼
𝐷𝑒 𝑥𝑔
𝑒𝑝𝑒𝐼 𝐶ො𝑥 𝑦
Video ID Classifier
𝐷1 𝑦1
𝐷2 𝑦22
2𝑥
÷
÷
𝐷𝐼1 𝑦𝐼1
𝐷𝐼2 𝑦𝐼22
2𝑥
÷
÷
Realism D.
Identity D.
IHPT
ℒ𝑎𝑑𝑣:𝑥𝑠
𝑥𝑡 𝐸𝑛𝑝
𝐸𝑛𝐼
Identity Enc.
Pose Enc.
𝑒𝑡
𝑝
𝑒𝑠
𝐼
𝐷𝑒 𝑥𝑔
𝑒𝑝𝑒𝐼 𝐶ො𝑥 𝑦
Video ID Classifier
𝐷1 𝑦1
𝐷2 𝑦22
2𝑥
÷
÷
𝐷𝐼1 𝑦𝐼1
𝐷𝐼2 𝑦𝐼2
2𝑥 ÷
Realism D.
Identity D.
ℒ1: 𝑥𝑔, 𝑥𝑡
′ ℒ1: 𝑒
𝐼 , Ƹ𝑒𝐼 ℒ1: 𝑒
𝑃, Ƹ𝑒𝑃 ℒ𝑝𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑙−𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑓: 𝑥𝑔, 𝑥𝑡
′, 𝑥𝑠 ℒ𝐶𝐸 𝐷𝑒, 𝐶 : 𝑦, ො𝑥
ℒ𝑎𝑑𝑣 1: 𝑦1, Τ
𝑥
𝑥𝑔 ℒ𝑎𝑑𝑣 2: 𝑦2, Τ
𝑥
𝑥𝑔 ℒ𝑎𝑑𝑣 𝐼1: 𝑦𝐼1, Τ
𝑥
𝑥𝑔 ℒ𝑎𝑑𝑣 𝐼2: 𝑦𝐼2, Τ
𝑥
𝑥𝑔
2÷ 2÷
[103] FSGAN:
𝑚: segmentation mask (face, hair, other), 𝑙: 3D facial landmarks, 
𝐻𝑛: 𝑛 passes through 𝐻 while interpolating 𝑙𝑠 to 𝑙𝑡
𝑥𝑠
𝑥𝑡
𝐿𝐸
𝑙𝑠
Reenactment
× 𝑛
𝑙𝑡
𝑥𝑟
𝑚𝑟
𝑥𝑠
′
𝐼𝑥𝑠
(𝑖)
, 𝑥𝑟
(𝑖)
VGG19
𝐻2
𝐻1
𝑚𝑡
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𝐻3
f
𝑥𝑟
′ p
𝑚𝑡
𝐻4
Occlusion 
in-painting
Blending
𝑥𝑔
𝐷1 𝑦1
𝐷3 𝑦3
𝑥𝑠
′
𝐷3 𝑦4𝑥𝑠′
FSGAN
ℒ1:
𝑚: segmentation mask (face, hair, other), 𝑙: 3D facial landmarks, 
𝐻𝑛: 𝑛 passes through 𝐻 while interpolating 𝑙𝑠 to 𝑙𝑡
𝑥𝑠
𝑥𝑡
𝐿𝐸
𝑙𝑠
Reenactment
× 𝑛
𝑙𝑡
𝑥𝑟
𝑚𝑟
𝑥𝑡
𝑓
𝐼𝑥𝑠
(𝑖)
, 𝑥𝑟
(𝑖)
VGG19
𝐻2
𝐻1
𝑚𝑡
Segmentation
𝐻3
f
𝑥𝑟
′ p
𝑚𝑡
𝐻4
Occlusion 
in-painting
Blending
𝑥𝑔
𝐷1 𝑦1
𝐷3 𝑦3
𝑥𝑡
𝑓
𝐷4 𝑦4𝑥𝑡
𝑓
ℒ1 𝐻1 : 𝑥𝑡
𝑓 , 𝑥𝑟
𝑓 ℒ𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐 𝐻1 : 𝐼ℓ∙ 𝑥𝑡
𝑓 , 𝐼ℓ∙ 𝑥𝑟
𝑓 ℒ𝑎𝑑𝑣1: 𝑦1, 𝑥𝑡
𝑓 /𝑥𝑟 ℒ1 𝐻1 : 𝑚𝑟, 𝑚𝑡
ℒ1 𝐻2 :𝑚𝑟 , 𝐻1,𝑚 𝑥𝑡 ℒ1 𝐻3 : 𝑥𝑟
′ , 𝑥𝑡
𝑓 ℒ𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐(𝐻3): 𝐼ℓ∙ 𝑥𝑟
′ , 𝐼ℓ∙ 𝑥𝑡
𝑓
ℒ𝑎𝑑𝑣3: 𝑦3, 𝑥𝑠
′/𝑥𝑡
𝑓 ℒ𝑎𝑑𝑣4: 𝑦4, 𝑥𝑔/𝑥𝑡
𝑓 ℒ𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑛−𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐 𝐻4 : 𝑥𝑡 , 𝑚𝑡, 𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒(𝑥𝑟
′ , 𝑥𝑡)
Fig. 12. Architectural schematics of the replacement networkswith their generation and training dataflows.
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5.2 Transfer
Although face transfers precede face swaps, today there are very few works that use deep learning
for this task. However, we note that face transfer is equivalent to performing self-reenactment on a
face swapped portrait. Therefore, high quality face transfers can be achieved by combining methods
from Section 4.1 and Section 5.1.
In 2018, the authors of [95] proposed DepthNets: an unsupervised network for capturing facial
landmarks and translating the pose from one identity to another. The authors used a Siamese
network to predict a transformation matrix that maps the xs ’s 3D facial landmarks to the corre-
sponding 2D landmarks of xt . A 3D renderer (OpenGL) is then used to warp x ⟨f ⟩s to the source
pose lt , and the composition is refined using a CycleGAN. Since warping is involved, the approach
is sensitive to occlusions.
Later in 2019, the authors of [151] created a self-supervised network which can change the
identity of an object within an image. Their ED disentangles the identity from an object’s pose
using a novel disentanglement loss. Furthermore, to handle misaligned poses, an L1 loss is computed
using a pixel mapped version of xд to xs (using the weights of the identity encoder). Similarly, the
authors of [85] proposed a method disentangled identity transfer. However, neither [151] or [85]
were explicitly performed on faces.
6 COUNTERMEASURES
In general, countermeasures to malicious deepfakes can be categorized as either detection or
prevention. We will now briefly discuss each accordingly. A summary and systematization of the
deepfake detection methods can be found in Table 3.
6.1 Detection
The subject of image forgery detection is a well researched subject [164]. In our review of detection
methods, we will focus on works which specifically deal with detecting deepfakes of humans.
6.1.1 Artifact-based Detection. Deepfakes often generate artifacts which may be subtle to humans,
but can be easily detected using machine learning. In 2014, researchers suggested this hypothesis
and monitored physiological signals, such as heart rate, to detect computer generated faces [29].
Regarding deepfakes, [82] monitored irregular eye blinking patterns and [28] monitored blood
volume patterns (pulse) under the skin.
Inconsistencies are also a revealing factor. In [74] and [43], the authors noticed that video dubbing
attacks can be detected by correlating the speech to landmarks around the mouth. In [154] it was
shown that similar artifacts appear when predicting the facial landmarks. With large amounts of
data on the target, mannerisms and other behaviors can be monitored for anomalies. For example,
in [5] the authors protected world leaders from a wide variety of deepfake attacks by modeling
their recorded stock footage.
Some artifacts appear where the generated content was blended back into the frame. The authors
of [4, 8, 38, 94, 163] used edge detectors, quality measures, and frequency analysis to detect artifacts
in the pasted content and borders. In [81] the authors detected deepfakes by decomposing them
into to their sources while identifying the content’s boundary. Some works identify and visualize
the tampered regions by either predicting masks learned from a ground truth, or by mapping the
neural activations to the raw image [37, 79, 100, 128].
The content of a fake face can be anomalous in context to the rest of the frame. For example,
residuals from face warping processes [83, 84, 86], lighting [129], and varying fidelity [73] indicate
the presence of generated content. In [156] and [91], the authors found that GANs leave unique
fingerprints and show how it is possible to classify the generator given the content, even in the
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presence of compression and noise. In [72] the authors analyzed a camera’s unique sensor noise
(PRNU) to detect pasted content.
As noted in Section 4.1, realistic temporal coherence is challenging to generate, and some authors
capitalized on the resulting artifacts to detect the fake content. For example, [54] uses an RNN to
detect artifacts such as flickers and jitter, and [112] uses an LSTM on the face region only. In [10] the
optical flow between frames is analyzed, and in [23] a classifier is trained on the two frames directly.
6.1.2 Undirected Approaches. Instead of focusing on a specific artifact, some authors trained
deep neural networks as generic classifiers, and let the network decide which features to analyze
[3, 34, 35, 45, 132]. In [90, 101, 111], it was shown that deep neural networks tend to perform better
than traditional image forensic tools on compressed imagery. Alternatively, to overcome noise
and other distortions, the authors of [144] measured the neural activation (coverage) of a face
recognition network to obtain a stronger signal from than just using the raw pixels. In [16] the
authors detected deepfakes by measuring an input’s embedding distance to real samples using
an ED’s latent space. To improve performance of their models, some add noise to their training
data [153] and others try to develop models which generalize better to unseen attacks/generators
through disentanglement [30] and semi-supervised learning [140].
6.2 Prevention & Mitigation
To prevent deepfakes, some have suggested that data provenance of multimedia should be tracked
through distributed ledgers and blockchain networks [47]. In [40] the authors suggested that the
content should be ranked by participants and AI. In contrast, [59] proposed that the content should
be authenticated and managed as a global file system over Etherium smart contracts. To combat
deepfakes, the authors of [87] showed how adversarial machine learning can be used to disrupt and
corrupt deepfake networks. The authors performed adversarial machine learning to add crafted
noise perturbations to x , which prevents deepfake technologies from locating a proper face in x .
7 DISCUSSION
7.1 Creation
Over the last few years there has been a shift towards identity agnostic models and high-resolution
deepfakes. Some notable advancements include (1) unpaired self-supervised training techniques
to reduce the amount of initial training data, (2) one/few-shot learning which enables identity
theft with a single profile picture, (3) improvements of face quality and identity through AdaIN
layers, disentanglement, and pix2pixHD network components, (4) fluid and realistic videos through
temporal discriminators and optical flow prediction, and (5) the mitigation of boundary artifacts
by using secondary networks to blend composites into seamless imagery (e.g., [48, 133, 147]).
Significant progress in this domain was made when researchers began using perceptual loss with
a pre-trained VGG Face recognition network. The approach boosts the facial quality significantly,
and as a result, has been adopted in popular online deepfake tools [1, 118]. Another advancement
being adopted is the use of a network pipeline. Instead of enforcing a set of global losses on a single
network, a pipeline of networks is used where each network is tasked with a different responsibility
(conversion, generation, occlusions, blending, etc.) This gives more control over the final output
and has been able to mitigate most of the challenges mention in Section 3.7.
Aside from quality, there are a few limitations with the current deepfake technologies. First, for
reenactment, content is always driven and generated with a frontal pose. This limits the reenactment
to a very static performance. Today, this is avoided by face swapping the identity onto a look-
alike’s body, but a good match is not always possible and this approach has limited flexibility.
Second, reenactments and replacements depend on the driver’s performance to deliver the identity’s
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Table 3. Summary of Deepfake Detection Models
Type Modality Content Method Eval. Dataset Performance*
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[163] 2017 • • • • SVM-RBF 250x250 • 92.9
[4] 2017 • • • • SVM * • 18.2
[154] 2018 • • • • • SVM * • 0.97
[73] 2018 • • • • SVM 128x128 • 3.33
[38] 2019 • • • SVM, Kmeans... 1024x1024 • 100
[8] 2019 • • • • • SVM * • 13.33
Classic ML
[5] 2019 • • • • SVM * • 0.98
[94] 2018 • • • • • CNN 256x256 • 99.4
[82] 2018 • • • • LSTM-CNN 224x224 • 0.99
[101] 2018 • • • • • Capsule-CNN 128x128 • 99.3
[16] 2018 • • • • ED-GAN 128x128 • 92
[35] 2018 • • • • CNN 1024x1024 • 0.81
[54] 2018 • • • • CNN-LSTM 299x299 • 97.1
[90] 2018 • • • • CNN 256ÃŮ256 • 94.4
[30] 2018 • • • • • CNN AE 256x256 • • 90.5
[3] 2018 • • • • CNN 256x256 • 0.99
[112] 2019 • • • • CNN-LSTM 224x224 • 96.9
[100] 2019 • • • • • CNN-DE • 256x256 • • 92.8 8.18
[34] 2019 • • • • CNN - • 98.5
[37] 2019 • • • • • CNN AE GAN • 256x256 • • 99.2
[128] 2019 • • • • • CNN+Attention • 299x299 • 3.11 0.99
[83] 2019 • • • • • CNN 128x128 • • 0.99
[86] 2019 • • • CNN * • 0.64
[45] 2019 • • • • • CNN+HMN 224x224 • • • 99.4
[79] 2019 • • • • • FCN 256x256 • 98.1
[153] 2019 • • • • • CNN 128x128 • 94.7
[140] 2019 • • • • • CNN 224x224 • 86.4
[132] 2019 • • • • CNN 1024x1024 • 94
[28] 2019 • • • • CNN 128x128 • • 96
[84] 2019 • • • • • CNN • 224x224 • 93.2
[10] 2019 • • • • CNN 224x224 • 81.6
[74] 2019 • • • • • LSTM * • 22
[43] 2019 • • • • • LSTM-DNN * • 16.4
[23] 2019 • • • CNN 256x256 • 97
Deep Learning
[156] 2019 • • • • • CNN 128x128 • • • 99.6 0.53
[144] 2019 • • • • • SVM+VGGnet 224x224 • 85
[81] 2019 • • • • • CNN • 64x64 • • • • 99.2
[72] 2018 • • • PRNU 1280x720 • TPR=1 @FPR= 0.03
[129] 2019 • • • Statistics • - •Statistics & Steganalysis
[91] 2019 • • • • PRNU * • 90.3
*Only the best reported performance of each paper is displayed to capture the ‘best-case’ scenario.
personality. We believe that next generation deepfakes will utilize videos of the target to stylize the
generated content with the expected expressions and mannerisms. This will enable a much more
automatic process of creating believable deepfakes. Finally, a new trend is real-time deepfakes.
Works such as [64, 103] have achieved real-time deepfakes at 30fps. Although real-time deepfakes
are an enabler for phishing attacks, the realism is not quite there yet. Regardless, deepfakes are
already very convincing [111] and are improving at a rapid rate. Therefore, it is important that we
focus on effective countermeasures.
7.2 The Deepfake Arms Race
Like any battle in cybersecurity, there is an arms race between the attacker and defender. In our
SoK, we observed that the majority of deepfake detection algorithms assume a static game with
the adversary: They are either focused on identifying a specific artifact, or do not generalize well
to new distributions and unseen attacks [30]. Moreover, based on the recent benchmark of [86],
we observe that the performance of state-of-the-art detectors are decreasing rapidly as the quality
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of the deepfakes improve. Concretely, the three most recent benchmark datasets (DFD by Google
[102], DFDC by Facebook [36], and Celeb-DF by [86]) were released within one month of each
other at the end of 2019. However, the deepfake detectors only achieved an AUC of 0.86,0.76, and
0.66 on each of them respectively. Even a false alarm rate of 0.001 is far too low considering the
millions of images published online daily.
Evading Artifact-based Detectors. To evade an artifact-based detector, the adversary only needs
to mitigate a single flaw to evade detection. For example, G can generate the biological signals
monitored by [28, 82] by adding a discriminator which monitors these signals. To avoid anomalies
in extensive neuron activation [144], the adversary can add a loss which minimizes neuron coverage.
Methods which detect abnormal poses and mannerisms [5] can be evaded by reenacting the entire
head and by learning the mannerisms from the same databases. Models which identify blurred
content [94] are affected by noise and sharpening GANs [63, 71], and models which search for the
boundary where the face was blended in [4, 8, 38, 81, 94, 163] do not work on deepfakes passed
through refiner networks or those which output full frames (e.g., [70, 96, 167] and [88, 158]). Finally,
solutions which search for forensic evidence [72, 91, 156] can be evaded (or at least raise the false
alarm rate) by passing xд through filters, or by performing physical replication or compression.
Evading Deep Learning Classifiers. Deep convolutions neural networks are very good at face
recognition, achieving state-of-the-art performance [92, 116]. This is because the hierarchical filters
in a CNN can effectively and efficiently extract and match visual patterns (e.g., parts of the face).
Therefore, it is understandable why many works have applied deep learning directly to the task
of deepfake detection (e.g., [3, 34, 35, 45, 132]). However, by hiding or planting subtle patterns in
an image, one can influence the output of the filters and alter the prediction. This attack, known as
adversarial machine learning, can be applied by an adversary on xд to evade detection. Research has
also shown that these small adversarial perturbations transfer across multiple models regardless
of the training data used [107]. Although more research is required to demonstrate that this attack
works well on deepfakes, it is entirely feasible and should be addressed in future work.
Moving Forward. Nevertheless, deepfakes are still imperfect, and these methods offer a modest
defense for the time being. Furthermore, these works play an important role in understanding the
current limitations of deepfakes, and raise the difficulty threshold for malicious users. At some
point, it may become too time-consuming and resource-intensive for a common attacker to create a
good-enough fake to evade detection. However, we argue that solely relying on the development of
content-based countermeasures is not sustainable and may lead to a reactive arms-race. Therefore,
we advocate for more out-of-band approaches for detecting and preventing deepfakes, including
the establishment of content provenance and authenticity frameworks for online videos [40, 47, 59],
and proactive defenses such as the use of adversarial machine learning to protect content from
tampering [87].
7.3 Deepfakes in other Domains
In this SoK, we focus on human reenactment and replacement attacks; the type of deepfakes which
has made the largest impact so far [11, 56]. However, deepfakes extend beyond human visuals, and
have spread to many other domains. In healthcare, the authors of [93] showed how deepfakes can
be used to inject tor remove medical evidence in CT and MRI scan for insurance fraud, disruption,
and physical harm. In [65] it was shown how one’s voice can be cloned with only five seconds
of audio, and in September 2019 a CEO was scammed out of $250K via a voice clone deepfake
[33]. The authors of [21] have shown how deep learning can generate realistic human fingerprints
that can unlock multiple users’ devices. In [115] it was shown how deepfakes can be applied to
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financial records to evade the detection of auditors. Finally, it has been shown how deepfakes of
news articles can be generated which has generated some concern [160].
These examples demonstrate that deepfakes are not just attack tools for misinformation, defama-
tion, and propaganda, but also sabotage, fraud, scams, obstruction of justice, and potentially many
more.
7.4 What’s on the Horizon
We believe that in the coming years, we will see more deepfakes being weaponized for monetization.
The technology has proven itself in humiliation, misinformation, and defamation attacks. Moreover,
the tools are becoming more practical [1] and efficient [65]. Therefore, it seems natural that
malicious users will find ways to use the technology for a profit. As a result, we expect to see an
increase in deepfake phishing attacks and scams targeting both companies and individuals.
As the technology matures, real-time deepfakes will become increasingly realistic. Therefore, we
can expect that the technology will be used by hacking groups to perform reconnaissance as part
of an advanced persistent threat (APT), and by state actors to perform espionage and sabotage by
reenacting of officials or family members.
To keep ahead of the game, we must be proactive and consider the adversary’s next step, not
just the weaknesses of the current attacks. We suggest that more work be done on evaluating the
theoretical limits of these attacks. For example, finding a bound on a model’s delay can help detect
real-time attacks such as [65], and determining the limits of GANs like [6] can help us devise the
appropriate strategies. As mentioned earlier, we recommend further research on solutions which
do not require analyzing the content itself. Moreover, we believe it would be beneficial for future
works to explore the weaknesses and limitations of current deepfakes detectors. By identifying and
understanding these vulnerabilities, researchers will be able to develop stronger countermeasures.
8 CONCLUSION
Not all deepfakes are malicious. However, because the technology makes it so easy to create be-
lievable media, malicious users are exploiting it to perform attacks. These attacks are targeting
individuals and causing psychological, political, monetary, and physical harm. As time goes on,
we expect to see these malicious deepfakes spread to many other modalities and industries.
In this SoK we focused on reenactment and replacement deepfakes of humans. We provided
a deep review of how these technologies work, the differences between their architectures, and
what is being done to detect them. We hope this information will be helpful to the community in
understanding and preventing malicious deepfakes.
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